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I.  Fiscal aspects of EU accession – Poland and Czech Republic 





For the ten Central and Eastern European countries a long way towards EU accession 
is coming to a successful end. Since the early years of transition, the prospects of EU 
membership has been a landmark of reforms targeted at building an economy based on 
free market principles. In the free market economy sound public finances play an 
important role in bringing about a stable macroeconomic environment that is 
conducive to a sustained growth and employment creation.  
 
There are further reasons for candidate countries to pay particular attention to public 
finance. Given the limited progress achieved so far in real convergence, the role that 
fiscal policy should play in supporting the catching-up efforts appears to be particularly 
important. Moreover, the candidate countries apply for membership in a club where 
strict constraints are imposed on budgetary policy. Some time after accession to the 
                                                 
∗ International Department of the National Bank of Poland. The views expressed in this paper are those of 
the author only and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Bank of Poland. 
3 EU, new Member States will be required to adopt the euro and give up autonomous 
monetary policy. This prospects call for efficient fiscal policy that will be ready to take 
over as the only macroeconomic instrument to stabilise the economy.  
 
On the other hand, the dangers of missing the above target are significant. The fiscal 
requirements coming from the transition and accession are likely to be challenging to a 
considerable period after accession. The problems with maintaining sound fiscal policy 
in the euro area countries raise question about feasibility of the EU fiscal rules.  
 
This paper reviews fiscal developments in Poland and the Czech Republic, and 
medium-term prospects against a broader background of candidate countries. An 
extensive part of the paper is devoted to EU fiscal rules. The reason for that is that the 
rules, which will soon apply to the candidate countries, are heavily criticised now.  
 
Fiscal developments in candidate countries 
 
The budgetary situation in the accession countries shows significant differences. Deficit 
ratios to GDP vary between a balanced budget (Bulgaria and Estonia) and a 
considerable deficit (Hungary, the Czech Republic). But still some general observations 
can be made. Deficits (in % of GDP) in the Central European countries (with the 
exemption of Slovenia) are clearly higher than those of the Baltic countries. Moreover, 
the phase of buoyant growth in recent years was not used for reducing deficit to GDP 
ratios in the Central Europe. In fact, deficits in most Central European countries were 
unchanged or on the rise in the period implying that the positive cyclical impact was 
offset or even overcompensated by a worsening of structural balances. This contrasts 
with the developments in the Baltic countries. The Baltic countries faced a rapid 
increase in deficit ratios in 1999 attributable to the shock caused by the Russian crisis. 
Although the Russian crisis led to substantial slowdown, fiscal positions were brought 
under control very quickly as growth re-gained momentum. Whereas the Central 
European countries followed obviously a pro-cyclical fiscal stance, this has not been the 
case for the Baltic countries. 
4  
Current national debt levels in the candidate countries depend very much on initial 
levels. The countries which started with high debt levels (Poland) are still heavily 
indebted. On the other hand, the countries with a low level at the beginning of 
transformation have kept a lower indebtedness (the Czech Republic). Although in some 
countries, notably in the Czech Republic, debt ratios started to rise.  
 
The recent slowdown in the world economy took its toll on both Poland and the 
Czech Republic. It is hardly surprisingly since both countries could be classified as 
small open economies although Poland to much smaller extent than the Czech 
Republic. Since 2000 the fiscal deficits in all the Central European countries have risen 
markedly. In Poland the deficit reduction was one of economic policy priorities in the 
1990-s and the deficit of the public sector continually diminished since the middle of the 
decade. The trend came to a halt in 2001 when a drastic deterioration of economic 
situation occurred. In 2000 the government deficit amounted to 3.6% of GDP and in 
the following year 3.9% of GDP
1. In 2002 the deficit deteriorated further to 4.1% of 
GDP. The deterioration was exacerbated by the fact that the slowdown was caused 
mainly by falling domestic demand. Along with falling demand the tax base shrank 
contributing to a deterioration of budget revenues. Polish authorities estimate that 0.61 
percentage points of the 2002 deficit was a cyclical component. It could be expected that 
when growth resumes, automatic stabilisers will improve the situation in government 
sector.  
 
The situation in the Czech Republic is slightly different. The government deficit 
deteriorated significantly in 2000 and it reached 4.3% of GDP. In the two consecutive 
years it deteriorated further to 6.4% of GDP in 2002. A growth performance of the 
Czech Republic was far better than that of Poland. However, the growth was, at least 
                                                 
1 Analysing the situation of public finance in the accession countries encounters significant data problems. 
The countries have been using various national methodologies as well as IMF’s GFS 86 methodology. 
Currently, the transition to ESA 95 is underway, but the data series are limited and vary between the 
countries. Efforts have been made to use the data consistent with ESA 95 methodology presented by the 
accession countries in their PEPs, European Commission and Eurostat. 
5 to some extent, supported by a massive fiscal stimulus, which on the other hand 
contributed to a fiscal deterioration.  
 
The cyclical component of a large Czech deficit is assumed to be much smaller than it is 
the case in Poland, which makes the overall deficit stubborn even during periods of 
fairly rapid growth. The main culprit of this structural deficit is the expenditure side of 
the government sector and the growing share of mandatory social expenditures.  
 
The size of the government sector was dramatically reduced at the beginning of 
transformation in all candidate countries. In fact, the candidate countries have had just 
ten years to develop from the basis a public finance system. Today the size of the 
government sector is on average higher in the candidate countries than in most 
emerging economies, however, this can be explained by underlying economic factors, 
such as income, trade openness, government debt and demographic structure. Upon 
those variables the European Commission (2002c) finds out that the actual size of the 
public sector in the accession countries is generally close to projected values. The largest 
discrepancy is found for Poland, where the actual level of government expenditure is 
more than 5 percentage points of GDP above the predicted one. In the Czech Republic, 
on the other hand, actual level is below the predicted one. 
 
In the Czech Republic the expenditures of the government sector amount to around 
47% of GDP. In Poland the relation of public sector expenditures to GDP was 
generally declining since 1994 (with the exception of 1999) and fell to less than 43% in 
2000. In 2001 and 2002 the expenditures were on a rise and reached almost 47% in 2002.  
 
Government expenditure in the accession countries are affected mainly by four group 
of factors: social spending, infrastructure spending, bad debt and cost of 
implementation of the acquis communautaire. 
 
6 The social security spending are large both in Poland and the Czech Republic. In 
Poland social transfers are planned to amount 19.4% of GDP in 2003. In the Czech 
Republic social transfers to households in 2002 have been estimated at 14.9% of GDP.  
 
The accession countries, similar to current EU members, are facing similar pressures for 
higher spending on pensions due to an ageing population. However, economic 
transformation puts a pension system under additional strain. Both Poland and the 
Czech Republic inherited mature pay-as-you-go schemes with rather generous benefits 
that were confronted with pressures on both the expenditure and the revenue side due 
to economic transition. In order to contain a serious escalation in the number of 
unemployed and to ease the social and political costs of restructuring state-owned 
enterprises many countries resorted to early retirement programs. At the same time, the 
contribution base shrank due to a decline in labour force participation, the rise in 
unemployment and the expansion of the shadow economy. Many countries, among 
them Poland and the Czech Republic, have since then introduced reforms and set up 
voluntary private pension funds. Additionally, Poland introduced mandatory pension 
system modelled on Latin American funds. The partial switch to the funded system 
entails considerable transition costs in the short run, which are borne by the state 
budget.  
 
The Polish system seems to be very well designed in order to cope with the issue of 
ageing population. Although in comparison to EU standards Polish population is fairly 
young, yet it has already developed symptoms of adverse changes in the demographic 
structure. The new pension system is thought to be flexible enough to adjust to 
growing demographic demands but ageing population pose challenges also to other 
policies, specifically health care systems and education.  
 
In 2001 the Czech Republic tightened the conditions for early retirement what caused 
temporary slowdown of the growth of social expenditures. In 2002, however, the social 
transfers rose again. The reform of pension system is crucial in view of fiscal risks 
stemming from ageing population. According to calculations of the Czech 
7 Government, if the current legal provisions stay in place, the balanced contribution rate 
will increase by 2 percentage points by the year 2005 and by another more than 2 
points by 2010. Afterwards the impact of ageing population on the economy will be 
even more pronounced with a significant impact on the general government. 
 
Table 1 
Projected financial performance of the public pillar following reforms approved 
through end-2001 
(Percent of GDP) 
  2000 2005 2010 2030 2050 
Czech Republic  -0.9 -0.9 -1.3 -4.7 -8.7 
Poland
1  -2.3 -2.2 -1.2 -2.2 -2.2 
1 Excluding the costs of the Farmers’ Pension Programme 
Source: Funk (2002) 
 
The second area of important public spending is connected with infrastructure, 
particularly of the environment and transport. The underlying reason for that is quite a 
large degradation of capital stock in those countries. If the governments want to remain 
attractive for FDIs they need to give high priority for infrastructure spending. The total 
public capital expenditure amounted to 3.1% of GDP in 2002 in Poland and 6.4% of 
GDP in the Czech Republic. 
 
The main part of infrastructure investment in the Czech Republic is carried out by the 
State Fund of Transportation Infrastructure. Its expenditures are financed by shared 
indirect taxes revenues and privatisation revenues. Also other indirect instruments are 
used for financing infrastructure, such as development loans provided by the European 
Investment Bank.  
 
Some types of expenditure come from the period of early transformation. Improper 
state policy or just connections between (state owned) banks and companies caused 
unreasonable financing coming from banks to companies. Loans were given on the 
basis of administrative decisions not on economic calculations. This behaviour caused a 
pile of bad debts, which governments have to acknowledge at some time. Although 
8 problems with bad debts occurred in all transition economies, the Czech case was the 
most difficult one. The Czech government consolidated huge bad debts in banking 
system into the Debt Consolidation Agency (CKA). In each of the past two years  the 
government transferred funds equivalent to 2.5% of GDP to CKA in partial settlements 
of outstanding losses (the write-off of accumulated loses is counted as government 
expenditure according to ESA 95 methodology). The still outstanding loses are worth 
about 4.5% of GDP, which the government will have to eventually pay to CKA. As 
long as the losses persist they will be counted as deficit according to ESA 95, but once 
they have been fully written off, fiscal deficit will fall. Backe et al. (2002) quotes a study 
of Tang et al. (2000) that estimate the cumulative fiscal cost of bank restructuring in the 
Czech Republic between 1991 and 1998 at 25.4% of GDP. The Czech Government 
expected the costs of bank restructuring to peak in 2002 at approximately 3.5% of 
GDP. This indicates that fiscal risks resulting from potential future banking sector 
failures seems to be rather limited and costs in this area related to transition will 
diminish in the future.  
 
Poland, on the other hand, suffers form severe costs of restructuring state-owned 
lagging behind industries. Main sectors that require continuation and intensification of 
reforms are coal mines and steel industry. According to Funk (2002), the latest 
programme of reforms in coal mines introduced in 1998 cost 1.8% of the 1998-GDP. 
The reforms in the steel industry are supposed to cost 40 million PLN in 2002 and 2003 
respectively. 
 
A significant part of fiscal burden consists of costs of implementation of the acquis 
communautaire  in the run-up to the EU membership. Such costs however will not 
disappear once the accession countries join EU. The applicants negotiated a bulk of 
transition periods which allow them to spread the necessary adjustments over longer 
periods. This means that the impact on budget will be felt longer. The Polish Ministry 
of Finance estimates that the transfers from the central government budget to the EU 
will amount to about 1.7 to 1.8% of GDP per year. Poland will be net recipient but 
many of the EU payments require contributions from the national budget. Moreover, 
9 some EU financial instruments require that a  payment has to be made primarily from 
national budget and later, after obtaining approval from an eligible EU institution, is 
reimbursed to the country. Such a mechanism, characteristic of the Common 
Agricultural Policy, could pose an additional pressure on the central budget in the first 
years of the EU membership. 
 
The general government revenue as a share of GDP has been on a declining trend in the 
1990-ties. Transition-accession countries had to set a new tax policy and build tax 
administration along with introducing a variety of new taxes and to develop systems for 
classifying new categories of tax payers and new forms of economic activities. Today 
the composition of revenues resembles those in other EU countries. They have 
introduced corporate income taxes and a system of personal income taxation. Value 
added taxes have generally replaced complex turnover taxes.  
 
Although the tax systems are broadly in line with the EU average, some important 
differences exist. The contribution of personal income taxes is relatively low compared 
with the respective EU average, whereas social security contributions are a relatively 
more important component than the personal income taxes with respect to taxes on 
labour income. This revenue mix could have adverse consequences for the cost of 
labour and therefore for the demand for labour. Thus reforming the structure and 
composition of taxes should be a part of the medium-term agenda of those countries 
(Backe et al. 2002).  
The personal income taxation in the candidate countries is a particular sensible area for 
reforms. They are characterised by high rates, progressive structure and numerous 
deductions and exemptions through which the effective tax collection is low compared 
to the EU.  
 
A corporate tax differs significantly among the accession countries. Broad differences in 
company taxation partly reflect different strategies to attract FDI, as some governments 
favour special treatments and non-tax incentives. According to IMF calculations 
10 effective tax rates have been much lower than statutory rates (in the Czech Republic 
about 10%, 22% in Poland). 
 
Indirect taxation has been generally aligned with the EU norms. The VAT system 
follows the EU guidelines but the standard rates exceed the EU average. Excise taxes are 
partly above and partly below the EU rates.   
 
Table 2 
Main tax rates in the Czech Republic and Poland 
(Percent)  




Value Added Tax 









 Lower  Standard 
Czech 
Republic 
5  15 40 15 31  5  22 
Poland  3  19 40 20 27  7  22 
Source: Compiled from Backe at al. (2002) and Polish Ministry of Finance. 
 
EU fiscal rules 
 
From 1 May 2004 onwards the current accession countries will become members of a 
club where fiscal policy is subject to strict supranational rules. The rules that did not 
exist prior to Maastricht, were introduced in the Treaty together with plans of 
launching of the single currency. EMU and the euro have completely changed the 
economic environment in the EU countries. Monetary policy and exchange rate policy 
are formulated at the Community level, other policies, mainly fiscal policy remain in 
national hands. The monetary policy and fiscal policy are the only available economic 
instruments of influencing aggregate demand and hence main instruments of economic 
policy. Thus when the monetary policy cannot respond to country-specific shocks the 
importance of fiscal policy increases.  
 
11 The external effects of national fiscal policy affecting other monetary union’s 
participants call for co-ordinating national fiscal policies in a monetary union. Outside 
the monetary union, when a government runs unreasonable fiscal policy pushing up 
deficits and debt, markets will price in higher risk premium in government’s bills. 
Higher interest paid on debt require larger budget expenditures and further build up of 
the debt. When markets assess the debt as unsustainable they could sell off their 
holdings and withdraw from the country. If such a feeling is shared by many market 
participants this could result in a downward pressure on the currency, and in the 
extreme, in a currency crisis.  
 
This does not happen in a currency union. The size of the union financial market is far 
larger than that of an individual country. Consequently, the impact of an increasing 
debt level on refinancing condition of the individual county is much smaller that in the 
absence of monetary union (European Central Bank 2003). One currency and an 
integrated financial market mean that greater recourse to capital markets by national 
governments to finance an increasing debt level will ultimately affect financial market 
conditions in the whole currency area. Those so-called spill-over effects are generally 
transmitted to the whole area via long-term interest rates. Expansionary fiscal policy in 
one country drains the union-wide private savings and put pressure on the cost of long-
term finance in all constituent countries. 
 
Such fears were familiar to the draftsmen of the Maastricht Treaty. In order to prevent 
national government from running unsound fiscal policy in the Economic and 
Monetary Union, several specific provisions concerning public finance were included in 
the Treaty. First and foremost, “sound public finances” were raised to one of the 
“guiding principles” of all the economic activities of the Community (Article 4). This 
provision is more of a political declaration than a specific policy rule but further articles 
make this general declaration more practical.  
 
In order to prevent from unsustainable build up of a debt and a “free rider” behaviour, a 
“no bail-out clause” was included in the Treaty. Article 103 stipulates that neither the 
12 Community nor a Member State is responsible for liabilities of any other Member 
State. Monetary financing of the debt has also been excluded in Article 101. Hence any 
acquisition by the ECB or any other central bank of government liabilities is forbidden. 
This rule is a basic element of the fiscal discipline and of the central bank independence. 
The provisions of the Treaty go much further. Not only is the direct financing by the 
central bank prohibited but merely a “privileged access” of any public institution to 
financial institutions. This provision  complements the prohibition of central bank 
financing, imposes market discipline in public sector borrowing, reinforces freedom of 
capital movements and gets rid of the distortions in the allocation of financial resources 
towards the public sector. 
 
The most prominent provision, however, was introduced in Article 104 as the so-called 
“excessive deficit procedure”. This Article requires all Member States to hold their 
deficits below 3% of GDP and their debts below 60% of GDP. Subject to some 
exception, when a Member State fails to obey the rules, the Council can introduce the 
procedure, described in the Article, which, in extreme case, can result in fines.  
 
When the start of stage III of EMU was approaching, some Member States (mainly 
Germany) felt that those provisions of the Treaty are not sufficient to ensure sound 
public finance that would not endanger the stability of the common currency. After a 
long debate a consensus was reached at 1997 Amsterdam European Council which on 
17 June 1997 adopted a Resolution on the Stability and Growth Pact. Based on that political 
agreement the Council adopted two regulations, which together with the above 
Resolution form the Stability and Growth Pact. The Pact took effect in full only after the 
euro was launched in January 1999. The three documents consisting the Pact 
correspond to its three main functions: 
-  preventive function - Council Regulation (EC) 1466/97 reinforcing the multilateral 
surveillance of budget positions and the co-ordination of economic policies;  
-  dissuasive function - Council Regulation (EC) 1467/97, accelerating and clarifying 
the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure;  
13 -  political commitment - contained in the Resolution of the Amsterdam European 
Council – that all parties involved in the implementation of the Pact (Commission, 
Member States, Council) will endeavour to implement the budget surveillance 
process in a full and timely manner according to the clearly defined responsibilities. 
The political commitment included in the Resolution should not be undervalued. 
Although it has no legal power, the budgetary process is of political nature and 
hence the political commitment is important. 
 
The controversies about SGP has surged lately when some Member States broke the 
reference value of budget deficit. The discussion escalated when the President of the 
Commission called the Pact “stupid”. Professor Paul de Grauwe, Belgian statesman and 
economist wrote in Financial Times: “The stability pact is a vote of no confidence by the European 
authorities in the strength of the democratic institutions in the Member countries. It is quite surprising that 
EU countries have allowed this to happen, and that they have agreed to be subject to control by European 
institutions that even the International Monetary Fund does not impose on banana republics” (Financial 
Times 2003).  
 
Are such restrictions really necessary?  
The benefits of budgetary discipline are obvious: 
-  sound public finance help maintain low interest rates which foster investment and 
growth,  
-  together with monetary policy they stabilise inflation expectations, 
-  by reducing the interest burden, help to restructure public spending and reduce 
taxation, 
-  allow an increase in public saving in order to cope with adverse economic 
consequences of ageing population,  
-  create room for manoeuvre in case of adverse economic disturbances and 
asymmetric shocks. 
 
In spite of those clear benefits, not many countries succeeded in achieving balance 
budgets. Between 1970 and 1990 the balance of general government in 15 EU countries 
14 recorded an average deficit of nearly 3% of GDP. The deficit even widened to 5.1% of 
GDP in the years 1991-1995 and only thanks to efforts connected to fulfilment of the 
Maastricht criteria fell to 1.6% over the next five years. The history shows clearly that 
the deficit bias of fiscal policy exists. There are many features of fiscal policy that 
contribute to the bias. The process of formulating fiscal policy is particularly spread 
over time. The period between the decision on application of certain measures and its 
impact on the economy could be long. During this period the cyclical situation may 
change and hence the applied measures may have a pro-cyclical effect. The decisions 
once taken by the Parliament and introduced in the law are very hard to reverse, which 
can have a negative impact in the long run, when the economic environment changes. 
Fiscal policy is also to much extent subject to political constraints. Because of the 
political cycle which is determined by elections, the fiscal measures are sometimes based 
on political rather than economic rationale.  
 
As it was shown above, in a monetary union there are even greater incentives to keep 
the public finance in the red. The cost-and-benefits calculus of running a deficit is 
evidently positive for the individual country, while for the union as a whole – negative. 
Consequently, some restrictions had to be applied in order to prevent EMU, from 
falling apart. Excessive deficit procedure and SGP were, as P. de Grauwe pointed it, “a 
vote of no-confidence” of Member States to one other, but the lack of trust was 
underpinned by the historical evidence, that many European countries failed to keep 
their houses in order.  
 
Current fiscal developments in EMU countries support, not diminish the importance of 
SGP as it is sometimes considered by its critics. If, in the presence of SGP - its 
objectives, rules and sanctions - some countries did break the deficit limits, how it 
would be in case of absence of any rules? 
 
Most of arguments against SGP invoke keynesian effects of fiscal policy in times of 
growth slowdown and argue that the Pact prevents the working of fiscal automatic 
stabilisers. However, the fact is that the 3% limit on deficit was not provided for a 
15 discretionary fiscal policy but just for automatic stabilisation in times of normal growth 
fluctuation. In times of adverse economic shocks and severe recessions the SGP allows 
for wider deficits. It is unfortunate that the slowdown in Europe occurred before all 
Member States brought their budgets to balance but this is not a charge against the Pact 
but against the lack of sufficient consolidation in EMU countries. 
The European Commission indicates (Public Finance 2002) that euro area countries 
missed the opportunity to exploit favourable growth conditions of the years 1999 and 
2000 and to consolidate their public finance. In the euro area as a whole cyclically-
adjusted primary balance deteriorated in 2000 and 2001. Taking into account positive 
output gap during those years the conclusion is that the policy in the euro area was pro-
cyclical. Failure to consolidate public finances in times of rapid growth constitutes the 
main reason of inadequate room for automatic stabilisers and rapidly deteriorated 
budgetary stance in consecutive slowdown. The current troubles with SGP point out to 
a failure of enforcement mechanism based on peer pressure rather than of rule-based 
fiscal policy strategy. Moreover, fiscal policy could learn a lot from monetary policy, 
where rule-based strategies have been successfully applied for at least a decade.  
 
The questions whether the quantitative rules provided by SGP are adequate for all 
Member States are, however, justified. The numbers of 3% and 60% concerning deficit 
and debt levels, as well as 2%, which determines the amount of growth fall justifying 
the breach of deficit limit, seem arbitrary. Nevertheless, this should not overshadow the 
usefulness of the whole fiscal policy framework proposed by the Treaty, and Stability 
and Growth Pact.  
 
16 Fiscal prospects for candidate countries 
 
At the beginning of their EU membership, the accession countries will have the status 
of a Member State with a derogation. This means that they will participate in fiscal 
policy co-ordination in lesser extent than the Member States which have introduced a 
common currency. First and foremost, they will not be subject to sanctions provided 
for by the SGP. As the worst “institutional” consequence (meaning the consequence 
stemming from the SGP) of having an excessive deficit,  the Council will be able to 
address recommendations to a country concerned and as the next step of the procedure, 
make the recommendations public. 
 
All other provisions of the Pact will apply to new Member States, together with its core 
objective to keep the fiscal position  “close to balance or in surplus” in the medium 
term. They will also participate in all co-ordination procedures, specifically they will be 
expected to submit medium-term macroeconomic programmes in form of convergence 
programmes (eurozone countries present stability programmes). Convergence 
programmes provide an essential basis for price stability and for a strong sustainable 
growth contributing to employment creation. They should specify the medium-term 
objective for the budgetary position of close to balance or in surplus and the adjustment 
path towards this objective; the expected path for the general government debt ratio; 
and set out the medium-term monetary policy objectives and their relationship with 
price and exchange rate stability
2. 
 
Fiscal rules that govern EU policies were set to improve transparency and predictability 
of fiscal policies. It could be argued that this kind of features are especially valuable for 
transition economies with short history of functioning of market economy. Large 
benefits should also come from improved investors’ confidence. Although all accession 
countries are functioning market economies, their status as “emerging markets” has 
fully disappeared. This makes the capital in those countries highly volatile and sensitive. 
When fiscal tensions arise, those countries can witness rapid shifts in capital flows 
                                                 
2 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 
17 which can result in currency crises. This is  particularly dangerous in light of expected 
participation in ERM 2 and plans of early adoption of the euro. 
 
There could be, however, arguments against too early implementation of the EU fiscal 
rules in the candidate countries. The required transparency for fiscal policy is not 
created by a simple quantitative rule itself. A rule, like 3% of excessive deficit, could be 
an incentive to shift fiscal operations off budget or introduce one-off measures which 
makes the situation even more blurred
3. Moreover, for the countries with large 
investment needs, the requirement of “close to balance or in surplus” could be a too 
rigid constraint. This may be appropriate for the countries with high debt levels but it 
could be questioned in case of some candidate countries like the Czech Republic where 
there is enough room before the debt reference value is reached. It is important that the 
budget constraint do not disturb necessary structural reforms and investment plans. 
This issue relates also to EU Member States and is included in the Commission 
proposal of reforms of SGP, but is of much higher importance in the accession 
countries.  
 
The EU membership does not bring only new fiscal policy rules but it also has 
important direct and indirect effects on the fiscal positions of the accession countries. 
On the one hand the EU membership implies substantial additional expenditure. They 
are primarily related to a membership contribution to the EU budget. Other costs are 
connected with implementation of the acquis. A significant problem for at least some 
accession countries will be related to co-financing of structural funds and regional 
development fund. The accession countries will also have to finance the completion of 
the transition – so called “second-generation reforms”. 
 
On the other hand, debt servicing costs will diminish. This will be connected with 
convergence of interest rates to the EU level as well as to better access to European 
                                                 
3 The scope of creative accountancy which is at least potentially available, is shown by the example of 
Portugal. The official figures released at the beginning of 2002 by the government showed the fiscal deficit 
of  2.2% of GDP. Because the quality of the date were questioned by the opposition party, only after 
elections the new cabinet set a group of experts under the chairmanship of central bank’s president to audit 
the government accounts. Apparently the deficit widened to 4.1% of GDP. 
18 financial market. However, full benefits of this kind will materialise only after joining 
the euro zone. 
 
19 Table 3 
Summary of fiscal effects of EU membership
1 
(% of GDP) 
 Czech  Republic  Poland 
Direct effects    
Contribution to EU budget  -1.25  -1.25 
Structural Fund transfers
2  -1.5 -1.5 
Cohesion Fund transfers  0.5  0.5 
Reform of public administration
3  -1.5 -1.5 
Phase-out of production subsidies  1.0  2.0 
Realignment of customs duties
4  -0.5 -0.5 
Tax harmonisation  0  0.25 




Structural reforms  +  + 
Tax competition  -  - 
Tax revenue windfall  +  + 
Decline in interest rates  +  + 
1 Annual effect on the fiscal balance over the medium term, following accession. 
2 National contribution. 
3 Including legal approximation. 
4 Including liberalization commitment under WTO.  
Source: Kopits and Szekely (2002)  
 
 
In order to prepare to the future membership requirements, the candidate countries  
participate in a voluntary initiative called the Pre-accession Fiscal Surveillance 
Procedure (PFSP) which is composed of three elements – the fiscal notification, the pre-
accession economic programme and the multilateral dialogue. The PFSP is designed to 
prepare the prospective Member States for the EU policy co-ordination and surveillance 
mechanisms. It aims to strengthen the technical, statistical, analytical and institutional 
capacity of each candidate country. In addition, it provides an opportunity for the 
candidate countries to present their economic policies in a multilateral context similar 
to that applying for the examination of the Member States’ convergence/stability 
programmes, although with no binding character. The PFSP started in the spring 2001. 
 
20 The first element of the PFSP is the fiscal notification. The candidate countries are 
asked to submit to the Commission an annual notification of general government 
budgetary positions in the same format as the one used by the current Member States. 
The Commission services evaluate the notifications, by monitoring countries’ fiscal 
positions, determining compliance of the data with ESA 95 standards. This evaluation 
plays an important role in identifying remaining weaknesses, and helps targeting any 
technical assistance that may be required to ensure the production of adequate statistical 
data by the time of accession.  
 
Secondly, each candidate country submits a Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP) 
on an annual basis. Similarly to the stability and convergence programmes, PEPs are 
expected to play a key role in setting the framework for policy-making in the candidate 
countries. Unlike the stability and convergence programmes, PEPs focus on the 
economic requirements needed in the period running up to the accession. They, 
therefore, concentrate predominately on the Copenhagen criteria, rather than the 
Maastricht convergence criteria. Each PEP consists of a review of recent economic 
developments, a detailed macroeconomic framework, a discussion of public finance 
issues and an outline of the structural reform agenda. The Commission services evaluate 
each programme, focussing on the institutional and analytical preparations for future 
participation in EMU and assessing whether the outlined policies are adequate to 
prepare a country for the accession. 
 
Finally, the Pre-accession Fiscal Surveillance Procedure explicitly envisages a 
multilateral dimension. This was requested by the ECOFIN Council in order to 
establish a regular in-depth dialogue between candidate countries and Member States, at 
various levels. To this end, members of the Economic and Financial Committee  and 
their counterparts from the candidate countries meet to discuss the result of the pre-
accession procedure. These high level meetings also serve to prepare the economic 
dialogue at a ministerial level.  
 
21 A short look at the medium-term fiscal frameworks presented in 2002 PEPs gives a 
picture of fiscal restraint and consolidation: countries with modest deficits intend to 
preserve their positions or even improve to full balance. On the other hand, most 
countries with higher deficits plan to reduce their deficits till 2005. However, the two 
analysed countries are exceptions to this general observation. The Czech Republic aims 
only at a moderate reduction of the deficit and Poland intends to reduce the deficit only 
towards the end of the framework period. The Czech authorities plan to reduce the 
deficit to 5.5% of GDP in 2005. The Polish PEP, prepared in the mid-2002 envisaged 
the reduction of the deficit from 4.1 % of GDP in 2002 to 2.2 % of GDP in 2005. 
However, the budget law, prepared just some month later, revised the figures towards 
more ambitious consolidation – from 4.4% of GDP in 2002 to a target ratio between 2.0 
and 1.0% of GDP in 2005.  
 
The 1.9 percentage points fall of deficit ratio between 2002 and 2005, projected in the 
Polish PEP, is to be reached by improvement of structural balance by 1.25 percentage 
points, cyclical component by around 1 percentage point and by a limited negative 
contribution of the interest rate component. In the Czech Republic the structural 
primary deficit is planned to fall from 4.8% of GDP in 2002 to 3.7% of GDP in 2005. 
The cyclical component improves only marginally and the interest rate component 
worsens. In addition the Czech PEP contains sensitivity analysis of public finance 
balance. It is argued that an improvement of the GDP growth rate by 1 percentage 
point improves the budget balance by around 0.3 percentage points. These calculations 
prove that the budget deficit is mainly of a structural nature. 
 
Medium term economic programmes presented in PEPs present only general overview 
of measures affecting government expenditures and revenues. Nevertheless it seems 
quite clear that those countries do not intend to increase expenditures in order to close 
their budget gaps. In Poland the share of revenues to GDP is expected to fall by about 
1.4 percentage points in 2003, before rising again through 2005. As an exception to 
almost all candidate countries, in the Czech Republic the government forecasts 
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Given the high tax rates, changes to the revenue side will likely be focused rather on 
broadening the tax base and improving tax collection efficiency. The Polish PEP points 
to increasing arrears in tax payments and proposes measures improving tax collection. 
Tax legislation is generally in line with the EU standards with only fine-tuning 
required. The planned harmonisation of indirect taxes should contribute to a small 
increase of tax revenues in the Czech Republic. In order to reduce tax evasion, on 31 
December last year the Czech Republic increased the lower VAT rate from 5% to 7%, 
while the upper VAT rate was cut from 22% to 21%. In 2001 Poland introduced 
interest gain tax in amount of 20% as well as excise tax on energy. 
 
The major part of consolidation process will require restructuring expenditures. 
Expenditure strategy in the Polish PEP is based on a rule “CPI + 1%” meaning that 
annual growth in expenditure at central government level should not exceed the 
forecasted CPI by more than 1 percentage point. However, in the budget law for 2003 
the expenditures are set to increase by 2.2% in real terms which means that the “CPI + 
1%” has been abandoned and in fact never applied.  
 
23 Poland plans to reduce public investment expenditures substantially to very low levels – 
2.5% in 2005. This significant cut may raise doubt whether this is feasible in the context 
of accession and catching-up process. In the Czech Republic public investment 
expenditures relative to GDP are projected to remain comparatively high (4.7% of GDP 
in 2005). This figure, on the other hand, rises question of whether spending plans in this 
area would not deserve to be reviewed for potential savings in order to contribute to a 
more forceful fiscal consolidation. 
 
The high rate of growth of social transfers, exceeding the growth rate of social 
contributions and tax revenues, is considered as a major risk for the government 
expenditures in the Czech Republic. A new system of remuneration of public 
administration employees will also affect public spending. Poland targets at a reduction 
of overall social and welfare expenditures in relation to GDP, from an initially high 
level, which is to be achieved by keeping real growth of such expenditures below real 
GDP growth. Most of the adjustments, however, will come only in 2004 and 2005. 
 
Most candidate countries expect a gradual reduction of the debt ratio, in line with 
decreasing deficits. Both Poland and the Czech Republic are major exceptions to this 
trend
4. The debt to GDP ratio is supposed to rise by 9.1% of GDP in the Czech 
Republic and by 2.3% of GDP in Poland between 2002 and 2005. There are, however, 
significant differences in debt ratio in the two countries: at end-2002 Polish debt-to-
GDP ratio stood at 41.8%, whereas the Czech one at 25.6%. Additionally, the Polish 
PEP gives estimates for the impact of change in interest rates on the government debt 
service. It is supposed that a rise of domestic (foreign) interest rate by 1 percentage 
point would amount to a rise of debt service expenditure by 0.4% (1.4%). The estimated 
elasticity for currency depreciation is 0.2.  
 
The interest payments on national debt constitute another important item of the 
expenditure side in both countries, although the burden differs along with the 
difference in debt ratio. For 2003 the interest payments are expect to amount to 1.1% of 
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24 GDP in the Czech Republic and 3.5% of GDP in Poland. The difference in debt 
servicing cost stem from different stock of debt but also form different interest rates 
paid on national debt.  
 
Therefore, countries like Poland where the debt and interest rates are high will enjoy 
big fiscal savings as interest rates and borrowing costs converge to the eurozone levels. 
Consequently, Poland has every incentive to join the eurozone as soon as possible. This 
would lead to a sharp reduction in domestic interest rates towards the euro levels and to 
big fiscal savings on domestic debt service. On the other hand, the Czech Republic, 
where benchmark government bonds are currently trading at or even through the euro 
curve, will not likely enjoy any fiscal savings from an interest rate squeeze. Fiscal 
benefits of early joining the eurozone will be thus much smaller. A rough estimate of 
the fiscal saving in the long run can be easily calculated assuming no future changes in 
the eurozone interest rates. According to data of Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB, 2003), 
the Czech Republic can expect no further savings on debt servicing costs from the 
eurozone entry. However, it could be argued that unless a radical finance reform takes 
place, the debt levels are likely to rise sharply in the coming years as well as the yields 
on government bonds. In this case the expenditure on debt servicing is posed to rise 
sharply. On the other hand, Poland’s gain from the eurozone entry could be as large as 
0,7% of GDP if it were able to pay interest rates around the euro level on its national 
debt. 
 
Those differences are well mirrored in the above countries’ plans for the eurozone 
entry. In Poland the discussion on when to introduce the euro is more advanced among 
academics then among politicians but official position included in the PEP is “the 
sooner, the better”. Last year an agreement between the Ministry of Finance and the 
National Bank of Poland was reached on general principles of Polish strategy of entry 
to the eurozone. Those institutions committed themselves to pursue a policy which 
would eventually lead to fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria in 2005. Since the 
inflation rate is already very low, interest rates are close to the Maastricht criteria and a 
safe margin on debt ratio exists, the budget deficit will be the key variable. If the path of 
25 reducing the deficit presented in the PEP (2.2% of GDP in 2005) or budgetary law for 
2003 (1-2% of GDP) is accomplished, the agreed strategy will enable to introduce the 
euro as soon as 2007.  
 
The Czech Republic evidently hesitated to release any clear intentions as far as the 
timetable of euro introduction is concerned. Only in December last year a 
comprehensive official strategy was published. Although the document is much longer 
than the Polish one, the conclusions are much more concise. The presented assessment 
of potential risks and benefits allows the Czech authorities conclude that the “fast 
entry” to the eurozone will be beneficial for that country. Consequently, the economic 
policy should be pursued in such a way as “not to rule out the possibility of joining the 
eurozone sometime around 2007”. This evasive wording means that the Czech 
authorities are aware of the risks embedded in fiscal policy stance. In spite of cautious 
formulation it seems that the year 2007 is too optimistic. In order to introduce the euro 
in that year the deficit criterion should be fulfilled by 2005, yet according to the PEP 
the actual deficit will exceed the reference value by 2.5% of GDP. In case of lack of any 
thorough public finance reform it is very unlikely that the deficit will fall quickly after 
2005, because of its rigid structural nature. Meanwhile, the long expected and urgently 
needed reform has been postponed. The reform should take form of significant and 
sustainable expenditure cuts, especially mandatory social spending. Old-type PAYG 
pensions system needs re-arranging and development of a second pillar. Also health 
policies are not fiscally sustainable in the medium term, which was addressed in the 
latest OECD survey (OECD 2003). 
 
A proposal of a reform package for the public finance has been recently announced in 
Poland. The package includes reform of the farmer’s pension system, liquidation of 
some state agencies and funds and further decentralisation of the public finance system. 
The critics, however, point to the proposed abolition of most personal income tax 
relief, which together with maintaining current tax rates will mean a larger tax burden. 
The government has already approved the general assumptions of the programme but 
the details have to be consulted with social partners and the central bank. The National 
26 Bank of Poland is to be consulted in view of a controversial intention to make use of a 
revaluation reserve which has been established according to new accountancy methods 
in the central bank. Full details of the strategy will be revealed in the middle of the 
year, probably after accession referendum (scheduled for 8 June) and the 






Fiscal policy in both the Czech Republic and Poland face similar challenges, stemming 
from completion of transition on the one hand and UE accession on the other. 
Successful answer to those challenges will require substantial improvements in the 
public finance system. The medium-term goal of the reforms should be to make public 
finance contribute to real and nominal convergence, which will allow the candidate 
countries to fulfil the Maastricht criteria and introduce the euro. At a later stage fiscal 
policy will need to be prepared to take over as the only available instrument to cope 
with country-specific shocks. On the other hand the flexibility of fiscal policy will be 
constrained by strict fiscal rules of the Treaty and Stability and Growth Pact. In the 
long run the accession countries, together with the current EU members, will 
encounter the fiscal costs of ageing population. 
 
There are some similarities in the current fiscal situation of the Czech Republic and 
Poland. The budget deficits have risen markedly in recent years in face of slowing 
growth. The Czech deficit, however, seems to be more of a structural nature than that 
of Poland. Both countries require substantial re-arranging of government expenditures. 
Most important item on the expenditure side is social spending with pension 
obligations displaying significant fiscal risks in the Czech Republic. Although social 
transfers are also important position in the Polish expenditures, pension system in this 
country is better prepared to cope with ageing population. A significant burden for 
both countries are costs related to restructuring of the economy. In the Czech Republic 
27 these mainly concern banking sector yet in Poland the heavy industry. As far as 
national debt is concerned, the situation is more favourable in the Czech Republic with 
moderate debt level and low interest rates. The Czech government seems to take 
advantage of its low debt and do not intend to reduce the deficit until 2005. Poland, in 
face of significant debt burden, sets ambitious deficit path in its PEP 2002. Deficits 
levels will be the main constraint on the time of EMU entry. Although both countries 
opt for fast path to EMU, it seems to be more likely that Poland will be first to 
introduce the euro. 
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On May 1, 2004 ten new Member States shall join the European Union. This shall be a 
historical milestone for the EU and in particular its new members, who shall reap many 
benefits. However, their effort to become fully integrated with one of the world’s largest 
single markets will not be over by then. That road shall be concluded in a few more years’ 
time, when they join the Economic and Monetary Union and adopt the single European 
currency. In order to complete this final step, EU members are required to meet the 
Maastricht convergence criteria, which ensure that economies joining the euro-zone are 
ready to participate in one currency and one monetary policy. Although majority of the 
acceding countries were centrally-planned economies barely 15 years ago, they have 
completed a remarkable transformation process and are now conducting sound economic 
policies allowing them to converge to their Western European counterparts. They have 
instituted modern, independent central banks, which have effectively fought high inflation 
experienced by these countries in the first years of transition. At present they are in a very 
good position to meet the monetary criteria of the Maastricht Treaty and enter the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) en route to adopting the euro. 
However, the Treaty also places obligations regarding fiscal policy on EMU candidates. 
For some of them this could prove to be a tougher challenge, as reduction of budget 
deficits is always politically unpopular and especially so in adverse macroeconomic 
conditions, which some of the candidate countries are experiencing in the period of run up 
to EU accession. The fiscal criterion was also the biggest challenge for many of the current 
EMU members. The Europe-wide fiscal consolidation process of the mid-1990s can thus be 
a valuable lesson for EU accession countries, who can draw conclusions on different 
retrenchment strategies pursued. They can also draw comfort from the fact that all 
countries aiming to meet the Maastricht criteria have in fact managed to achieve this 
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30 objective (although Greece did so a year later than the other EMU countries) and their 
citizens now have euros in their wallets. 
This paper is aiming to examine the European fiscal consolidation experience of the 1990s 
and to draw implications for accession countries, some of whom will have to conduct 
similar consolidation in order to qualify for EMU. 
1.  The rationale behind EMU fiscal rules 
 
One of the vital features of the institutional framework of the EMU is strong fiscal 
discipline. This is meant to support the independent monetary authority European Central 
Bank (ECB) in its mandate of preserving price stability. The authors of the Treaty were 
particularly concerned about preventing a repeat of fiscal policy failures, which occurred in 
Europe in the 1970s and 1980s (Buti and Giudice, 2002). These years were an era of rapidly 
rising share of the general government sector in the economy. In countries belonging to the 
euro area, the relation of government expenditures to GDP had risen from 36% in 1970 to 
a high of over 52% in 1993 (European Commission, 2000). Government revenues also 
increased very significantly during that time, but not quite as fast as spending. As a result, 
net borrowing of euro area countries grew from almost nil in 1970 to a range of 4%-5% in 
the 1980s. This had inevitably resulted in a quickly rising stock of public debt, which in 
late 1970s totalled less than 30% of GDP, but by early 1990s its relation to GDP had more 
than doubled. Growing debt had in turn fuelled a further rise in expenditure in the form of 
interest payments, which by 1990 amounted to around 4% of GDP. 
To make matters worse, fiscal policy in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s has tended to be 
pro-cyclical. This means that government budgets did not help to dampen cyclical 
fluctuations of the economy as they could and should have, but instead have contributed to 
amplifying output swings. The budget should be anti-cyclical primarily through the 
working of automatic stabilisers. In a situation of a cyclical downturn, tax revenues are 
lower, while unemployment-related and social spending tends to be higher, resulting in a 
higher deficit and helping the economy come out of recession. Meanwhile, during an 
upturn, tax revenues are buoyant, fewer citizens require social assistance of the state and 
the deficit is thus automatically reduced. However, this was not the case in the period in 
question. Deficits did not fall as expected during economic upturns, implying that rather 
than allow for automatic stabilisers to work, policymakers opted for tax cuts or spending 
31 increases in periods of boom. This has in turn forced them to tighten fiscal policy in times 
of recession, as they could not let the deficit and public debt rise indefinitely. 
There are two main conclusions to be drawn from these developments, which imply that a 
radical change in fiscal policy was required. The first one is that policies carried out in the 
1970s and 1980s were simply unsustainable, as evidenced by the rapid growth of public 
debt. The second is that such pro-cyclical policies would have been much more dangerous 
in a monetary union, where an excessively lax fiscal policy stance in one country cannot be 
countered by restrictive monetary policy, which is the same for all countries. Similarly, if 
one country conducted a restrictive fiscal policy during a downturn, because its public debt 
had risen to extremely high levels already, a single monetary authority could not focus on 
reviving the economy of that one particular country. 
 
2.  Fiscal criteria of the Maastricht Treaty 
 
The fiscal story of the 1970s and 1980s, outlined above, was an important factor in the 
design of the rather rigid fiscal framework of the Maastricht Treaty and, consequently, the 
Stability and Growth Pact, which is meant to ensure fiscal prudence within the euro zone. 
There are two basic types of fiscal rules, which can help enforce fiscal discipline: (Buti and 
Giudice, 2002) 
a)  Numerical targets, namely explicit constraints on fiscal variables, such as spending, 
deficit and debt or their growth 
b)  Procedural measures conducive to formulation of disciplined fiscal policy 
Numerical targets are simple to implement and monitor, provided there are good fiscal 
accounting standards. The drawback of tight numerical rules is that they enforce strict 
discipline also during economic downturns, which can lead to procyclical fiscal policy, if 
policymakers are not prudent enough to lower the deficit during a boom. A possible 
solution to this problem would be using numerical targets for structural budget balances, 
but this is methodologically difficult, as it would involve a numerical target based on an 
unobservable variable – the output gap. Another important drawback of numerical targets 
is that they encourage using one-off measures or even creative accounting measures in order 
to attain the right figure on paper. Such measures are not conducive to prudent fiscal policy 
and thus do not comply with the objectives which fiscal rules are supposed to achieve in 
32 the first place. As shown later on in this discussion, such measures were in fact employed 
by some EMU candidates to attain an illusory improvement in their fiscal position. 
Procedural measures are aimed at creating “hierarchical” budgeting procedures, in which 
the supreme fiscal authority has strong power to maintain spending limits set. At supra-
national level, a supra-national body is assigned the power to assess the fiscal position of 
national governments and sanction them for failure to meet numerical targets. 
The institutional framework of the Maastricht Treaty is a combination of numerical and 
procedural measures. On one hand, the Treaty stipulates that Member States shall attain a 
high degree of sustainable convergence in order to be admitted to a monetary union. One 
of the elements of this convergence is sustainability of the government financial position, 
specified as a deficit below 3% of GDP and public debt not higher than 60% or in case of 
higher debt, it should be approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace. 
On the other hand, the European Commission is granted the right to verify the financial 
position of governments of Member States and prosecute them in case of failure to meet 
the numerical targets. In such a situation, the Commission can launch a procedure aimed at 
correcting excessive deficits. This procedure can culminate with sanctions in the form of 
non-interest bearing deposits and fines. 
 
3.  Budgetary adjustment in the 1990s 
 
The Maastricht Treaty was a powerful stimulus for European Union countries to 
consolidate their budgets. The role of the Treaty and the ‘carrot’ of future EMU 
membership is particularly evident, when considering the unfavourable economic climate 
of the early 1990s in spite of which a remarkable fiscal consolidation has been achieved 
(European Commission, 2000). All 11 future members of the EMU,
1 had embarked on a 
fiscal consolidation path, although for example Ireland need not have done so, since it had 
already reduced its budget deficit significantly in the late 1980s. This means that there are at 
least 11 interesting cases of fiscal retrenchment to analyse.  
Considering that each of these 11 countries began its consolidation process from a different 
starting point, in a different economic and political setting, there is no surprise in the fact 
that they have pursued very diverse strategies. There are different ways of classifying these 
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33 strategies, with the most common division being that into revenue- and expenditure-based 
retrenchment strategies. The European Commission distinguished also a third path – the 
“switching’ strategy in which countries first resort to revenue adjustments and then switch 
to expenditure cuts.  
However, another classification can be offered, one which relates to the numerical nature 
of Maastricht Treaty targets. As mentioned earlier, these can also be attained through 
superficial measures. We would therefore propose to divide the consolidation strategies 
into three groups:  
- expenditure-based  consolidations, 
- revenue-based  consolidations, 




Following the failure of Austria’s first EMU-aimed budgetary retrenchment effort in 1995, 
when the deficit turned out at 5.1% of GDP, a comprehensive reform package was 
introduced in the following year. Consolidation measures were introduced for most 
categories of revenues and expenditure, however, the bulk of the adjustment occurred on 
the spending side. Expenditure decreased by 2.8 percentage points of GDP between 1994 
and 1997. The cuts were focused in such areas as public administration wages, family 
allowances, other welfare transfer payments, unemployment benefits, subsidies to the 
business sector, reduction of health care costs. Furthermore, early retirement options were 
restricted. In spite of the need to reduce the deficit within a short period of time, the 
Austrian government implemented several systemic measures, rather than resorting to 
temporary tax increases or spending cuts. Taxes were also adjusted, through elimination of 
some concessions and allowances, mainly in the area of direct taxes. These measures 




At the beginning of the 1990s, Finland was undergoing quite pronounced economic 
difficulties, caused by the breakdown of trade with the former Soviet Union and a banking 
34 crisis. As a result, the country ran a high budget deficit, exceeding 5% of GDP. However, 
in 1995 a determined fiscal consolidation strategy was implemented, leading to quick 
reduction of the deficit in subsequent years and achievement of a budget surplus in 1998. 
This strategy involved radical measures on the expenditure side, as public spending 
decreased by 12 percentage points between 1992 and 1999. The government undertook 
firm measures to lower social transfers and intergovernmental transfers. The pension 
system had undergone a comprehensive overhaul, including lowering accrual factors, less 
favourable calculation of pensionable wage and lower indexation. Access to unemployment 
benefits was tightened and the policy of subsidising industries altered. Thanks to such 
extensive measures on the expenditure side of the budget, the government was able to not 
only attain a budget surplus, but also to lower social security contributions, with the aim 
of promoting employment. 
 
Ireland 
The “Irish miracle” is a well-established phrase in economic literature, which says a lot 
about Ireland’s macroeconomic performance over the past two decades. The country has 
achieved a spectacular turnaround by implementing a host of bold structural reforms, one 
of which was a major overhaul of public expenditure, conducted already back in the 1980s. 
This made Ireland the only EU country meeting the Maastricht fiscal deficit criterion on 
the day the Treaty was signed. However, prior to its spending reforms, Ireland’s fiscal 
policy was very lax and public debt soared to levels in excess of 100% of GDP. The 
government was therefore intent on maintaining prudent fiscal policy, so as to facilitate a 
steady reduction of the debt level, while at the same promoting employment. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, additional fiscal adjustment took place, but this time on the 
revenue side of the budget, primarily through broadening of the corporate tax rate. 
However, between 1994 and 1999 public spending was further lowered by 5.9 percentage 
points of GDP. This was attained thanks to a reduction in wage compensation of public 
employees, agreed with trade unions, as well as lower transfers. As a result, Ireland attained 
a budget surplus of 2% of GDP in 1999, while reducing its debt level to 43.9%, half of what 
it was barely five years earlier. 
 
35 Netherlands 
Although the budget deficit of Netherlands exceeded the Maastricht reference value only 
by a marginal 0.1 of percentage point of GDP in 1993, in the following years the deficit 
deteriorated, reaching 4.2% in 1995, as a result of an economic downturn. However, 
already in 1994 the government accepted a fiscal consolidation strategy focused on reducing 
real expenditure by 0.7% per year on average, with the bulk of the adjustment coming in 
the area of social security. A health care financing reform was undertaken and a law 
introduced to limit the number of disability claimants. Unemployment eligibility was then 
tightened and social assistance structure simplified. As a result of these measures, primary 
expenditure decreased by more than 5 percentage points of GDP between 1992 and 1999. 
Meanwhile, the tax burden had increased in 1993, but in the subsequent years personal 
income taxes for the lowest earners were lowered, as were social security contributions, 
both with the aim of promoting employment. Some of the ensuing revenue loss was offset 
by an upward adjustment of indirect taxes. From 1997 onwards the consolidation effort 
was additionally supported by a decrease in interest payments. 
 
Spain 
The Spanish consolidation effort was somewhat delayed, in comparison to other euro area 
countries. At the beginning of the 1990s the country’s macroeconomic situation 
deteriorated, leading to shortfalls in tax revenues and causing the government to undertake 
discretionary measures to counter the crisis, such as higher transfers to social security funds 
and public companies. This had resulted in a high budget deficit, which peaked at 7% of 
GDP in 1995, with just two years to meet the Maastricht target of 3%. However, in 1994 
the government initiated its expenditure-based fiscal consolidation, aimed at meeting the 
reference value. Retrenchment measures had been undertaken in several spending 
categories, including agreements on wage moderation and a public employment freeze, 
agreement on containing growth of health care spending, restricting access to 
unemployment benefits, adjustments in the pension system, causing lowering of 
replacement rates. As a result of these steps, primary expenditure declined by more than 5 
percentage points of GDP between 1993 and 1999. On the revenue side, indirect tax rates 





The European Commission classified Belgium’s consolidation effort as an example of a so-
called “switching” strategy, in which tax increases are followed by expenditure restraint 
(European Commission, 2000). The Belgian authorities provided the following explanation 
for such a strategy – hard measures on the revenue side would stabilise market expectations 
and thus facilitate the ensuing expenditure restraint. This rationale was particularly valid 
for Belgium, which had accumulated a stock of public debt exceeding 120% of GDP, 
meaning that market expectations about the success of the consolidation strategy had 
important implications for debt servicing costs. However, for the purpose of this 
classification, Belgium is included among countries pursuing revenue-based consolidation, 
as revenue measures outweighed those on the expenditure side, in terms of adjustment in 
relation to GDP. 
At the beginning of the previous decade, Belgium introduced hard measures on the revenue 
side, causing all major tax categories to increase as a proportion of GDP. Corporate taxes 
were raised by limiting deductions and depreciation write-offs. Taxes on pension and life 
insurance payments were introduced and indexation of personal income tax thresholds 
suspended. Indirect taxes were also raised. However, after 1994, the government introduced 
some tax lowering measures, aimed at long-term creation of unemployment. Contributions 
to social security were thus reduced, particularly for lowest earners, young unemployed 
and sectors most exposed to international competition. The government also introduced 
some short- and long-term expenditure restraint measures. The latter initiatives were 
focused in the areas of health care financing, unemployment benefits, as well as the growth 
of wage compensation. 
 
Greece 
In the first half of the 1990s, the situation of Greek public finances was one of the worst in 
Europe, casting serious doubt over the country’s ability to meet the Maastricht criteria. 
Throughout that period, the public sector deficit exceeded 10% of GDP, leading public 
debt to rise above 100%. Interestingly enough, despite a radical increase in taxes, enacted at 
the beginning of the decade, the deficit remained above 10% until 1995. This was due to a 
37 moderate increase in public expenditure and rising costs of servicing the piling public debt. 
The revenue-raising effort included excise tax increases, VAT harmonisation, and several 
measures aimed at limiting tax evasion, as well as introduction of new principles of taxing 
farmers. Tax deductions and exemptions in corporate income taxation had been abolished 
or limited. As a consequence of these sweeping tax changes, the current revenue to GDP 
ratio expanded from 31.9% of GDP to 48% of GDP. Expenditures were reduced only 
modestly after 1995, although some of this adjustment had been achieved by moving public 
investment off budget (Von Hagen et al., 2001). These steps, combined with significantly 
reduced interest payments, have allowed Greece to stabilise its deficit well below the 3% 
reference ratio towards the end of the 1990s. 
 
Portugal 
This is another example of a country with a high budget deficit of over 6% at the beginning 
of the Maastricht consolidation process. In 1992 the first fiscal consolidation programme 
was implemented, with several measures aimed at raising tax revenue, such as changes in 
income taxes, VAT rates and efforts to improve tax administration. However, these steps 
did not yield a lasting fiscal improvement, as in 1993 the government increased public 
spending in reaction to an economic crisis, raising subsidies to farmers, exporters and 
enacting a programme of low cost housing loans. A second wave of revenue-based 
consolidation began in 1994, supported by moderate expenditure reduction in the form of 
wage and transfer moderation. However, these measures were soon reversed, as the 
spending policy yet again became expansionary. In spite of this, the government did 
manage to effectively lower the fiscal balance to –2.6% of GDP in 1997, thanks to strongly 
falling interest rate payments from 1995 onwards. 
 
Mixed consolidation strategies featuring one-off measures 
As mentioned previously, the numerical nature of the Maastricht fiscal deficit criterion can 
cause attempts to satisfy it using superficial measures, rather than firm and lasting fiscal 
consolidation strategies. In case of some of the euro area countries, it can be argued that the 
desire to meet the Maastricht criteria and join the EMU was stronger than the desire to 
actually attain a sustainable improvement of the fiscal position. This inconsistency of 
objectives manifested itself in resorting to emergency measures and in some cases even 
38 creative accounting in order to show a sufficiently low deficit in 1997. Although 
emergency measures appeared in several countries, which had to curb high deficits, perhaps 
the three countries outlined below relied on them to greatest extent. 
 
France 
At the beginning of the 1990s France’s fiscal policy was an expansionary one, which, 
coupled with unfavourable economic conditions, has led to a general government deficit of 
6% in 1993. The government proposed an expenditure-based consolidation strategy, but it 
has not been successful, as evidenced by the deficit of 5.5% of GDP in 1995. This is because 
long-term spending reduction measures such as the pension reform of 1994, were 
accompanied by various subsidies granted to specific sectors of the economy and new social 
security benefits. At the same time, indirect taxes were raised, but the effects of this step 
were offset by introduction of a tax scheme supporting small and medium sized businesses. 
Since the deficit remained excessive, the government resorted to emergency short-term 
measures to meet the Maastricht criteria. These included blocking appropriations, 
temporary freezing of wages, introducing a social security debt repayment levy and raising 
the corporate tax rate on larger firms. Finally, the government took on the pension 
obligations of France Telecom, in return for a one-time payment equal to 0.5% of GDP, 
which improved the budget balance in 1997. As a result, France managed to meet the 
reference value for the deficit. (Milesi-Ferretti, 2000). 
 
Germany 
Although Germany showed relatively low budget deficits at the beginning of the 1990s, the 
true picture of fiscal stance was obscured by several special funds and semi-governmental 
entities which provided off-budget unification support to East Germany. The government 
initiated a consolidation effort in 1993, but it turned out not to be very effective, due to 
conflicting objectives. The government did not want to lower social transfers, which would 
affect particularly the Eastern part of the country, but at the same time it sought to reduce 
tax burden on businesses, which had increased in previous years in order to finance the 
unification process. Furthermore, economic conditions were not conducive to achieving a 
reduction in the deficit. This had pushed policymakers to resort to emergency measures, 
such as spending restraints, in order to meet the Maastricht target in 1997. 
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Italy 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the fiscal picture of Italy was one of the most troublesome 
in all of Europe, with a deficit close to 10% of GDP and public debt higher than the GDP. 
A tremendous consolidation effort appeared necessary and the Italian government began 
with a revenue-based retrenchment, as a result of which revenues increased from 41.7% of 
GDP in 1990 to 48.3% in 1993. However, these measures were mostly of a short-term 
nature and ended in 1994, following which revenues fell sharply. This is when decisive 
efforts were undertaken to lower expenditures, including a health care reform and a second 
pension reform, after the previous attempt did not succeed in significantly lowering 
spending. Expenditure decreased by 2.5 percentage points of GDP, but as the initial deficit 
had been very high, by 1996 it had only been reduced to 7.1% of GDP – more than double 
the Maastricht reference value. Facing the need to achieve an improvement in the budget 
balance of 4 percentage points of GDP in one year, the government resorted to numerous 
emergency measures. Spending restraints were introduced on intergovernmental transfers, 
access to early retirement benefits postponed and indexation of high pensions suspended. 
Limits were introduced on health care expenses, particularly on pharmaceuticals. On the 
revenue side, some of the tax deductions had been abolished and property, corporate, VAT 
taxes and social security contribution rates were all raised. The previously introduced 
extraordinary tax on firm assets had been extended. In 1997 as special one-year, progressive 
“Euro” tax had been introduced, with rates varying from 1.5% to 3.5%. Interestingly, the 
tax was partly reimbursed in 1999. Measures, which could be considered creative 
accounting, were also employed in Italy. For example court-ordered payments of pension 
outlays, which were made in 1997-2000, were retroactively imputed back to the years when 
the liabilities were incurred (1993-1995) leaving the deficit in 1997-2000 unchanged (Milesi-
Ferretti,2000). 
 
Fiscal consolidation in the 1990s - recapitulation 
The table below shows the remarkable improvement in the budget balances of the 11 
members of the EMU. 
Table 1. Budget balances (in % of GDP) of EMU countries in the 1990s 
40   1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Austria -4,2  -4,8  -5,1  -3,8  -1,7  -2,3 
Belgium -7,3  -5,0  -4,3  -3,8  -1,9  -0,9 
Finland -7,3  -5,7  -3,7  -3,2  -1,5  1,3 
France -6,0  -5,5  -5,5  -4,1  -3,0  -2,7 
Germany -3,1  -2,4  -3,3  -3,4  -2,7  -2,1 
Greece -13,8  -10,0  -10,2  -7,4  -4,0  -2,5 
Ireland -2,3  -1,7  -2,2  -0,2  0,7  2,1 
Italy -9,4  -9,1  -7,6  -7,1  -2,7  -2,8 
Netherlands -3,1  -3,6  -4,2  -1,8  -1,1  -0,7 
Portugal -6,1  -6,0  -4,6  -4,0  -2,6  -1,9 
Spain -6,7  -6,1  -7,0  -4,9  -3,2  -2,6 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, 2001 
The Maastricht Treaty turned out to be a very effective impulse leading to successful 
reversal of the 25-year deterioration in the public finances of EU countries. The deficit of 
the euro area fell by 3.5 percentage points of GDP between 1993 and 1997 to reach a level 
below the 3% of GDP threshold. Was this a sufficient adjustment? It may appear so 
considering that all countries except for Greece, attained a deficit below 3% of GDP in 
1997. This means that EMU countries consolidated their budgets sufficiently to enter the 
EMU. 
However, it is important to note that after EMU candidates meet the entrance criteria and 
join the Union, they need to continue to maintain fiscal discipline. In fact, they are bound 
by even stricter rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The Pact was adopted by the 
European Council in 1997 as a means of ensuring budgetary discipline inside of the EMU. 
It includes measures to strengthen surveillance of budgetary positions as well as detailed 
regulations on the excessive deficit procedure of the Maastricht Treaty. Moreover, as far as 
the numerical target for the deficit is concerned, the SGP constitutes a very important 
interpretation of the Maastricht reference criterion. The Pact states that Member States 
should achieve a medium-term budget position “close to balance or in surplus.” This is 
crucially important, because it means that the 3% of GDP limit is not a target, but an 
absolute ceiling, which may not be violated, except for exceptional situations. The SGP 
therefore imposes the following fiscal strategy on Member States: their budgets should be 
41 close to balance or in surplus when their economies grow at the trend rate. This would 
ensure, that the deficit does not breach the 3% of GDP level during normal cyclical 
downturns. 
Aside from an economic downturn which could undermine the newly improved budgetary 
positions of EMU countries, another key issue is the quality of the consolidation strategies. 
For example, if an adjustment is attained through short-lived measures such as introduction 
of special temporary taxes or suspension of indexation of public sector wages for one or 
two years, the budget position is likely to deteriorate after these measures are revoked. 
Therefore, it is important to look at the quality of the fiscal adjustment achieved in EMU 
countries. 
 
4.  Fiscal developments in EMU following the consolidation period 
 
The fiscal position of EMU countries in the years following their consolidation effort is a 
telling indicator of the quality of the fiscal adjustment. The fiscal imbalance of most euro 
area countries deteriorated between 1998 and 2002 and in some cases it is expected to 
deteriorate further by 2004. To some extent, this is due to negative cyclical developments. 
However, those countries which have consolidated their budgets to reach a position close 
to balance or in surplus in the late 1990s, shall have no problem maintaining their deficit 
within the 3% of GDP limit, even during an economic downturn.  
Let us examine the fiscal situation in EMU countries, divided into the same three groups as 
above – according to their consolidation strategies. 
Table 2. Post-consolidation budget balances (in % of GDP) of countries which pursued 
expenditure-based retrenchment strategies 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Austria -2,4  -2,0  -1,5  0,1  -0,6  -1,1  -0,4 
Finland 1,3  2,3  6,7  5,1  4,7  3,3  3,0 
Ireland 2,1  2,0  2,4  1,2  -0,3  -0,6  -0,9 
Netherlands -0,8  0,5  1,3  0,2  -1,1  -1,6  -2,4 
Spain -2,5  -1,1  -0,4  0,0  -0,1  -0,4  -0,1 
Source: European Commission (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003) 
Note: excluding UMTS revenues 
42 As the above table shows, the improvement of fiscal positions in this group of countries 
appears to be quite permanent. In 2001 none of the countries from the group recorded a 
public finance deficit. In the following years their balances have deteriorated somewhat due 
to the economic downturn, however, none of them has, or is expected to breach the 3% of 
GDP reference value for the deficit. 
 
Table 3. Post-consolidation budget balances (in % of GDP) of countries which pursued 
revenue-based retrenchment strategies 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Belgium -1,1  -0,9  0,0  0,2  0,1  -0,2  -0,1 
Greece -2,5  -1,8  -0,8  -0,4  -1,2  -1,1  -1,0 
Portugal -2,1  -2,0  -1,7  -4,2  -2,7  -3,5  -3,2 
Source: European Commission (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003), OECD Economic Outlook (for Greece in 1998-2000 
period) 
Note: excluding UMTS revenues 
 
The fiscal situation in this group of countries is diverse. Belgium and Greece continued to 
reduce their deficits following the pre-EMU consolidation period and are expected to 
maintain low deficits until 2004. Meanwhile, Portugal’s fiscal balance slipped considerably 
in 2001. Although the deficit was initially forecasted to be under 3% in that year, it actually 
turned out above 4%. Portugal quickly took measures, partly of one-off nature, to reduce it 
in the following year, but according to European Commission forecasts, the situation was 
not fixed permanently and further problems are expected in 2003 and 2004. It is worth 
pointing out, that while all of these countries relied mainly on raising revenues to lower 
their deficit in the 1990s, their behaviour on the expenditure side differed. Belgium 
supported its consolidation effort by a moderate cut in spending. Greece allowed its 
expenditure to rise, but only by a modest 2 percentage points between 1989 and 1999. 
Meanwhile, Portugal’s public spending grew by well over 5 percentage points between 
1991 and 1998. This could help explain why the consolidation effort of that country 
proved to be insufficient to permanently keep the deficit under 3% of GDP. 
43 Table 4. Post-consolidation budget balances (in % of GDP) of countries which pursued 
mixed retrenchment strategies, including one-off measures and creative accounting 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
France -2,7  -1,8  -1,4  -1,5  -3,1  -3,7  -3,5 
Germany -1,8  -1,1  -1,0  -2,7  -3,6  -3,4  -2,9 
Italy -2,8  -1,9  -1,5  -2,6  -2,3  -2,3  -3,1 
Source: European Commission (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003) 
Note: excluding UMTS revenues 
The present fiscal picture of this group of countries is the most troubling. All three 
countries are expected to breach the Maastricht deficit criterion at some point in the 2002-
2004 period. This casts a doubt over the quality of their adjustment effort. 
 
5.  Quality and macroeconomic effects of European fiscal consolidations 
 
The conclusions which can be drawn from the European fiscal consolidation of the 1990s 
are broadly in line with a considerable body of literature investigating fiscal retrenchments 
and the factors which can determine their success or failure. 
The first such factor is size and persistence of budgetary adjustments. Large and sustained 
consolidations strategies can have positive effects for demand, offsetting the negative 
demand effect of reduction in the deficit. Such expansionary effects of fiscal consolidations 
have been called non-Keynesian, with the Irish consolidation process of the 1980s a flagship 
example of a major fiscal contraction, which has served as boost for the economy. These 
effects operate through several channels, with credibility of the adjustment being the 
common link. One of the reasons why lower government demand does not necessarily 
have to cause a contraction in the economy, is that it can be offset by an increase in private 
demand, caused by anticipation of lower taxes in the future. Credible fiscal policy may also 
affect the behaviour of labour market participants. (European Commission, 2000, Giavazzi 
and Pagano, 1995) 
However, probably the most important factor for the success of a fiscal consolidation is its 
composition. Numerous studies have found that expenditure-based adjustments are much 
more likely to be successful and lasting, particularly if they are concentrated in politically 
sensitive areas such as social transfers and public wage expenditure. An important channel 
44 here is the supply-side impact of fiscal policy on labour costs and competitiveness. 
Conversely, revenue-based adjustments usually have a negative effect on labour costs. 
Alesina and Perotti (1996) cite the example of the Danish adjustment of 1983-1986. The 
consolidation effort was radical and credible and the cyclically adjusted budget balance 
improved by more than 11% as a result. However, Alesina and Perotti found that the 
increase in personal income taxes, which was part of the adjustment, negatively affected 
labour costs and thus the competitiveness of the Danish economy. Following the 
consolidation process, Denmark entered a recession.  
The European experience of the 1990s appears to confirm these findings. The five countries 
which undertook comprehensive measures to reduce their public spending, managed to 
achieve a lasting improvement in their budget balances, maintaining a safe margin from the 
Maastricht reference value even during an economic downturn. Three countries pursued 
revenue-based consolidation strategies and each of their cases should be considered 
separately. Belgium raised taxes significantly, but at the same time it had reduced spending, 
using not only one-off measures, but also some systemic changes in such areas as health 
care and unemployment benefits. The overall consolidation effort certainly met the first 
criterion in that it was determined and credible. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the 
consolidation turned out to be a lasting one. The case of Greece was different, as the entire 
adjustment effort was on the revenue side. However, that revenue raising effort was also 
very determined and permanent and may have thus been perceived as a credible. This was 
not the case in Portugal, where two waves of tax raising measures occurred, but both were 
followed by expansionary policy on the expenditure side. This implies that the Portuguese 
consolidation effort may have lacked the decisiveness and resolve necessary for economic 
agents to perceive it as lasting. 
Judging by post-consolidation performance, the adjustment efforts of the countries 
pursuing a “mixed” strategy appears to have been the least successful. This is fully in line 
with the theory outlined above. The reliance of these countries on one-off measures and 
creative accounting implies that they did not have determined and consistent strategies to 
achieve an improvement in the budget balance of the necessary size. Therefore, they were 
not able to benefit from positive credibility effects.  
 
45 6.  Fiscal perspectives in EU accession countries 
 
It is as yet too early for definite declarations regarding future euro adoption by the 
accession countries. However, all of these countries, with the single exception of the Czech 
Republic, intend to meet the Maastricht Treaty fiscal criteria by 2005 (European 
Commission, 2003). In cases of some of them, a considerable adjustment shall be required, 
but overall, their fiscal situation is better than that of current EMU members at the 
beginning of their consolidation process.  
Table 5. General government balances in accession countries (% of GDP) 
PEP forecasts   2001 
Turnou
t 
2002 2004 2005 
Cyprus -3,0  -2,6  -0,6  -0,3 
Czech Republic  -5,5  -6,4  -5,7  -5,5 
Estonia 0,5  -0,2  0,0  0,0 
Hungary -4,2  -5,7  -3,0  -2,5 
Latvia -1,9  -1,8  -2,2  -2,0 
Lithuania -2,3  -1,9  -1,6  -1,5 
Malta -7,0  -5,2  -3,9  -3,1 
Poland -3,1  -4,1  -3,3  -2,2 
Slovakia -5,4  -7,8  -3,8  -2,0 
Slovenia -2,5  -1,8  -1,0  -0,8 
Source: European Commission (2003) 
None of the ten accession countries, except for Malta, has a public debt to GDP ratio 
exceeding 60%. Furthermore, the three Baltic states and Slovenia had a deficit below the 
Maastricht reference value already in 2002. The pre-accession programme of Cyprus also 
forecast a deficit under 3% of GDP for 2002 (and its further reduction in the following 
year), although the European Commission expects the reference deficit level to be exceeded 
in 2003 and 2004. On the other hand, the four Central European accession countries – 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, have let their fiscal positions deteriorate 
considerably in recent years. Three of those countries – Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – 
are aiming for a deficit reduction in the next few years. Their consolidation strategies are 
46 outlined in their Preaccession Economic Programmes (PEPs). It would thus be interesting 
to consider how these strategies compare to those employed by EU countries in the 1990s 




The budget deficit of Hungary was, next to that of Slovakia, the largest among the all 
accession countries in 2002. The deficit target in the 2002 PEP was 5.7% of GDP, but the 
turnout could well have been considerably higher. By 2005, the government of Hungary 
intends to reduce the deficit to 2.5% of GDP. The proposed consolidation strategy is 
entirely expenditure-based, as revenues are actually forecasted to decrease by around 2-3 
percentage points of GDP between 2002 and 2005. Part of the spending reduction will 
come from lower interest payments. The PEP lists three possible other solutions to lower 
expenditure: improving efficiency of management of public funds, reduction of the rate of 
growth of government investments and reforming the system of subsidies to the corporate 
sector. At the same time, the government apparently intends to increase its spending on 
health care, education, public administration and public security, in particular by raising 
public wages. 
The strategy presented in Hungary’s PEP does not include any sweeping measures to 
significantly reduce public spending. Instead, it promises higher spending in some areas. 
Such formulation of the consolidation strategy casts a doubt over feasibility of attaining the 
target of a reduction in public expenditure equal to 6 percentage points of GDP. Combined 




According to Poland’s PEP, the public finance deficit was 4.1%
2 of GDP in 2002, indicating 
that a relatively small adjustment was required to reduce it below 3%. The deficit appears 
to be particularly moderate when considering that Poland is in a much different 
macroeconomic situation, than other Central European accession countries. GDP growth 
                                                 
2 According to Polish authorities’ interpretation of ESA 95 accounting rules. This interepretation is still subject 
to consultation with Eurostat. 
47 was only 1.3% in 2002, the lowest out of all accession countries. This implies, that if the 
economy begins to recover in the coming years, as the government is expecting it to, the 
budget balance shall improve automatically. However, the PEP does specify some measures 
on the expenditure side of the budget, facilitating a reduction of the deficit to 2.2%. 
Spending is set to decrease by 2.5 percentage points of GDP between 2002 and 2005. This 
includes such measures as consolidation of some of the public sector entities, such as funds 
and agencies, tightening eligibility for benefits from the farmer social security scheme, 
change in the formula for indexation of benefits. 
If the economy does indeed recover and spending is restrained as the government proposes, 
Poland should be able to meet the reference value for the budget deficit. However, the 
example of some EMU countries shows that it may not be sufficient to lower the deficit to 
barely less than 3% of GDP when economic growth is buoyant, as this implies an excessive 
deficit during a recession. 
Slovakia 
As mentioned previously, Slovakia is also facing a high general government deficit, 
reaching almost 8% of GDP in 2002 (European Commission, 2003). Similarly as in the case 
of Hungary, the target deficit for 2005 is 2.6% of GDP. Slovakia also intends to pursue an 
expenditure-based consolidation strategy, with revenues expected to decrease in relation to 
GDP by 1.6 percentage points, almost exclusively due to lower social security 
contributions. In order to achieve the deficit target, spending will therefore have to be 
reduced by around 6 percentage points of GDP. Slovakia’s PEP calls for numerous 
measures to help achieve this goal. They include balancing of the health care budget and 
rationalisation of social benefits via improved control over these transfers and 
consolidation of the various institutions, which are paying out the benefits. Education is to 
be reformed through increasing the role of the private sector in its financing. Above all, 
Slovakia is pursuing a significant public finance management reform, including measures to 
improve control and auditing of public spending, implementation of programme 
budgeting, new classification of the budget and establishment of the State Treasury, 
coordinating and supervising disbursement of public funds. 
The government of Slovakia is therefore pursuing several systemic measures to limit public 
spending.  
 
48 7.  Fiscal consolidation strategies of accession countries – summary evaluation 
 
Having examined the cases of three Central European accession countries looking to 
consolidate their budgets in order to meet the Maastricht criteria for EMU membership, 
the positive conclusion is that all three are planning to rely on spending reductions, rather 
than raising taxes, to achieve this goal. As evidence of consolidations in EU countries in the 
1990s shows, such strategies are more likely to succeed. However, another important factor 
determining the success of fiscal consolidations is their size and persistence. Half-hearted 
measures, particularly those based on one-off measures, are likely to only cause a short-
term contraction of demand and then be reversed. Considering these arguments, the fiscal 
consolidation plans of Hungary may be a cause for concern. The strategy calls for 
reduction of some spending, but at the same time for increases in other categories and 
sweeping tax cuts. This raises doubts whether a considerable adjustment will actually be 
attained.  
The strategy outlined in the Polish PEP also does not fully satisfy the criteria of a 
successful fiscal consolidation. The strategy relies to some extent on the anticipated cyclical 
upturn to attain an improvement in the budget balance. Meanwhile, the presented forecast 
of public expenditure suggests that the adjustment on the expenditure side will occur more 
in the form of small steps, than an extensive overhaul. Although this may be sufficient to 
lower the deficit below 3% of GDP, the improvement may prove not to be lasting. 
Out of the three consolidation programmes presented above, that of Slovakia appears to be 
the closest to the model approach. It includes several systemic measures aimed at lowering 
expenditures. If these measures are bold enough, the consolidation strategy could well 
attain the objective of a lasting reduction in the deficit together with all its positive 




The introduction of a single currency in Europe had very significant implications not only 
for monetary policy of Member States, but also for their fiscal policies. During the two 
decades preceding the decision to create a single currency, these have been pro-cyclical and 
overly expansionary, leading to a build up of public debt. Continuation of such policies 
49 would have undermined the macroeconomic stability of the euro area and ability of the 
European Central Bank to fulfil its mandate. 
The states willing to join EMU were thus obliged by the Maastricht Treaty to consolidate 
their budgets and attain deficits below the reference value of 3% of GDP. A remarkable 
Europe-wide consolidation process ensued. Varying strategies were pursued to correct 
public finance imbalances, which in some cases were extremely high. In the end, all 
countries seeking to reduce their deficits had succeeded, but as the following years showed, 
the quality of the fiscal adjustment varied. Those countries, which lacked decisiveness and 
determination in their consolidation effort, resorting to temporary and one-off measures 
instead of systemic reforms, have found their low deficit positions not to be lasting. 
Meanwhile, those countries which relied on extensive expenditure cuts, reached a budget 
position close to balance, meaning that they were not in a danger of exceeding the 3% of 
GDP limit even during an economic downturn.  
The 2004 expansion of the European Union means that quite soon as many as ten new 
countries may be willing to join the EMU. Although their overall fiscal position is better 
than that of EU countries at the beginning of the 1990s, some of the accession countries 
will have to undertake fiscal adjustments of similar size as those of current EMU members. 
They are planning to pursue expenditure-based retrenchment strategies, which is a good 
sign, but does not guarantee success. In order to attain a lasting improvement in the budget 
balance, such as required by the Stability and Growth Pact, bold and decisive measures are 
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51 III.  Monetary and fiscal policies in Poland and Czech Republic in the 
perspective of EMU accession 
Contribution by Jolanta Zombirt 
 
Such an exceptional event as the creation of the EMU and the euro has not had 
happened never before. The most common challenges concerning EMU and the euro are: 
fiscal policy making, monetary policy making, euro area being a non-optimal currency area 
and the political legitimacy of EMU. It is worthwhile stressing that economic policies – 
except from monetary policy – are still framed by the individual member states or by 
coordination with others. Still, “experiment called euro starts to have effects on practically 
every area of economic policy – making in Europe: it will influence the allocation of 
resources, the distribution of income, stability and growth, as well as the formal and 
informal institutions on labour, products and financial markets within the euro area”.
1 
 
It is than of the utmost importance to define what are the chances for the euro to 
preserve its influence and to combat inflation after accession of ten new member states. We 
will try to begin with the assessment of four areas mentioned above, drawing some 




Legal framework in this area, i.e. the absence of central co-ordination within EMU, 
implies that EMU will not be able to respond to asymmetric shocks and disturbances in a 
satisfactory way
2. This framework will also contribute to some pro-cyclical fiscal 
behaviour, completely in a different way that it is prescribed in Keynesian advises. Will – if 
the member states are not ready to decide on the co-ordination of fiscal policies in the euro 
area. What, however, should be extend of this co-ordination, nobody can answer at this 
stage. It seems that the first step to some harmonisation of the fiscal policy within the euro 
                                                 
1 EMU and the euro – the first 10 years, Economic Papers, European Commission, Directorate – General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs, February 2002 
2 Brunila A., Buti M., Franco D., The Stability and Growth Pact. The Architecture of Fiscal Policy in EMU, 
Palgrave, Houndmills and New York, 2001. 
52 area has been already done: the national fiscal authorities do not have access to national 




It is too early to evaluate and to make any guidelines for the monetary policy in the 
euro area. It is an unprecedented experiment summing up the experience of the member 
central banks. European Central Bank, during the first years of operations, has showed 
some weaknesses, for example, being too slow with reduction of its main interest rates. 
 
EMU as a non-optimal currency area 
 
The EMU and the euro have been established on the base of political will to expand 
and deepen European integration. It means that politicians have ignored the theoretical 
preconditions encompassed in optimal currency area approach. Ironically, the prospects 
and a short history of the euro show that this single currency, circulating freely from 
January 2002, strengthens credibility of EMU. 
 
The political legitimacy of EMU 
 
At the roots of EMU we can find two political powers, i.e. France and Germany. 
However, their influence on other member states was so polarised that it could be unwise to 
say that any other countries are marginalized. As long as all member states and their 
inhabitants, including newly accepted, will be of the opinion that the benefits of the euro in 
broad political and economic terms exceed the costs, EMU will maintain the political backing. 
Thus, it is important when predicting the fate of the legitimacy of the EMU – project to 
forecast an economic and then political environment for future Europe. So, although 
fundaments of EMU have apparently replaced the Keynesian orthodoxy, they seem to be 
palatable from the political point of view. These fundaments have gathered together the views 
of policy-makers (central bankers and ministers of finance), theories of macroeconomic 
policy being conducted in member states and the institutional framework (mainly European 
Central Bank and European System of Central Banks).
53 Institutional arrangements 
 
An obvious example of the joint concern about stability of EMU, its success in 
monetary and fiscal field, was an imposition of specific ceiling on the public debt and 
deficits for the member states and an agreement called the Growth and Stability Pact, 
assisting to preserve a tight fiscal discipline. A sustainability of all the convergence 
indicators, as a whole, is also regarded the key issue for the candidate countries. However, 
accession to the Eurozone has to be, and it is in fact, preceded by required adjustments. In 
particular, the adjustments are necessary in the sphere of monetary, exchange rate and fiscal 




As the exchange rate stability is concerned it is necessary to maintain for at least 
two years a currency of a candidate state applying to EMU (but being already a member of 
the EU) within a exchange rate mechanism called ERM II. It implies the fixing of a central 
parity vis-à-vis the euro and the establishment of a band around it. It is then of the utmost 
importance to have a central parity properly defined because it – in most cases – would be a 
rate to convert a national currency into euro. A proposal of a level of a central parity is 
passed to European Ministers of Finance.  Then, together with ECB, the final parity is 
fixed on the base of a thorough evaluation of the specific features of convergence (i.e. 
purchase parity power of a given national currency), potential volatility and the interaction 
between central parity and the market exchange rate. In the “in-between” period it requires 
in-deep preparations to the concurrent introduction of the euro and a change in credit and 
currency risk management procedures in the financial sectors of the candidate states. 
 
The other very important convergence criterion strictly connected with the 
requirement of the ERM II membership is a fiscal test, i.e. ceilings for budget deficit and 
state indebtedness. Article 104 of the Treaty establishing the European Community sets 
forth that member states must avoid excessive government deficits. The decision on 
whether an excessive deficit exist is made by the European Council based on a report 
                                                 
3 As it has been stated in the project realised by the Czech National Bank titled “Priorities in four research 
areas”. 
54 presented by the European Commission. When the existence of an excessive deficit is 
decided, the Council makes recommendations to a member state concerned with a view to 
bring that situation to an end. It is worthwhile stressing than under the Stability and 
Growth Pact financial sanctions may be imposed on EMU member state in the form of 
either a non-interest bearing deposit or - after two years of the decision to impose 
sanctions, unless the excessive deficit has been reduced – a fine. It is obvious that fixing the 
exchange rate and giving up an independent monetary policy requires solid and healthy 
fundamentals of a given economy. Monetary policy needs frequent interactions with fiscal 
policy and financial sector development. That is why the channels of monetary 
transmission should be efficient and the response from the fiscal decision-makers should be 
clear and responsible. 
 
An inflation test has to be passed but also a monetary policy has to be adjusted to 
the conditions in the ESCB. For the candidate countries it is then required to evaluate the 
state and a range of the monetary instruments in possession of their central banks, and also 
their inflation targeting approach, to be able to exist in the broaden EU in the “in-
between” period and then, to pass smoothly to EMU. 
 
The pre-EMU economic policy system turns out to be a monetary dominance 
regime, in which monetary authorities in the member states apply an “active” (counter-
inflationary) monetary policy, whereas fiscal policy is “passive”
4. In particular, fiscal 
authorities react to debt accumulation by increasing primary surpluses, thereby 
guaranteeing fiscal solvency. Interestingly, the macroeconomic institutional architecture of 
EMU can also be categorised as a monetary dominance regime. Still, one could observe 
some apparent differences. The most important is that the variability of fiscal-policy shocks 
rather common during pre-entry period has to be reduced by an active fiscal policy in 
order to maintain the 3% reference level. However, such volatility in the stable 
                                                 
4  Has EMU shifted policy?, Economic Papers, European Commission, Directorate – General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs, February 2002 
 
 
55 environment tends to be much lower after joining the Eurozone. It is the result of a fact 
that the member states governments tend to apply a counter-cyclical fiscal policy.   
 
A policy regime is defined by a specific combination of fiscal and monetary policy 
behaviour. Since monetary and fiscal policy are closely connected, any positive or 
normative conclusion about one branch of policy depends on assumptions about the 
behaviour of the other branch. So, fiscal policy can be called “passive” or “Ricardian” if its 
primary aim is to preserve solvency. It is the case of all the economies trying to achieve 
Maastricht criteria. A “passive” fiscal policy has been observed during the period preceding 
the single currency among the member states of the EU. Similarly, this kind of a fiscal 
policy is being conducted in a majority of the candidate states, more or less depending of 
the extend of the independence of their central banks.  
 
The after-EMU policy regime tends to strengthen the relations between an “active” 
monetary policy and a “passive” fiscal policy. It is an effect of an institutional framework 
within the Eurozone
5. On one side, a single independent bank, the ECB, is in charge of 
conducting monetary policy with a strong mandate of preserving price stability, explicitly 
defined as an inflation rate below 2% over the medium term. On the other side, the 
Stability and Growth Pact constrains the behaviour of the various independent national 
governments in conducting fiscal policy. In other words, the Pact calls for fiscal policy to 
be “passive” in member states. 
 
For all the candidate countries, the future compliance with the EMU requirements 
implies a definition of a common macroeconomic policy for all member states
6. Based on 
the Treaty, three distinct phases for the adoption of the EMU acquis by accession countries 
has to be specified, namely: 
•  The pre-accession period 
•  The period from accession to the adoption of the euro 
•  Euro area phase after adopting the euro. 
                                                 
5 ibidem 
6 The macroeconomic policy framework for EU membership and euro area participation – the role of budgetary 
policy, European Commission, Directorate General, Economic and Financial Affairs, Brussels, May 2002. 
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The pre-accession countries, being already at the edge of entering EU seem to have 
completed the requirements included in the first period mentioned above. Apart from the 
famous and rather general criteria formulated at the Copenhagen Summit in 1993 (the 
existence of a market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and 
market forces within the Union), they have already implemented the required EMU 
legislation to be able to have the status of “member state with a derogation” as regards the 
adoption of the euro (Art.122), i.e.: 
•  Completion of the orderly liberalisation of capital movements (Art. 56) 
•  Prohibition of any direct public sector financing by the central bank (Art. 101) 
•  Prohibition of privileged access of the public sector to financial institutions (Art. 
102) 
•  Alignment of the national central bank statutes with the Treaty, including the 
independence of the monetary authorities (Art. 108 and 109). 
 
After accession, the new member state will have the statute of “member state with a 
derogation” granted in the accession treaty. It will have to show adherence to the aim of 
economic and monetary union and compliance with the relevant parties of title VII of the 
EC Treaty and the other EMU acquis. These are: 
•  Treatment of exchange rate policy as a matter of common interest and, eventually, 
participation in the exchange rate mechanism – ERM II (Art. 124) 
•  Treatment of economic policies as a matter of common concern and co-ordination 
of economic policies between the member states through participation in 
Community procedures (Art. 98 and 99) 
•  Avoidance of excessive government deficits and adherence to the relevant 
provisions of the stability and growth pact (Art. 104) 
•  Further adaptation of the national central bank’s statutes with a view to integration 
in the ESCB (Art. 109) 
•  Progress towards the achievement of a high degree of sustainable convergence (Art. 
121) 
 
57 With accession, the common macroeconomic policy framework gets more 
constraining, with a strong reinforcement of fiscal discipline and the integration of other 
economic policies. Budgetary policy and outcomes become subject to the excessive deficit 
procedure and the non-punitive parts of the Stability and Growth Pact. The new member 
states will also have to obey the rules of common exchange rate policy. This implies that 
they will try to avoid excessive fluctuations of the exchange rate and in due time, perhaps 
rather soon after accession, they will participate in ERM II. Economic policies of these 
countries will become an element of policy co-ordination and multilateral surveillance 
procedures.  
 
At the moment the public discussions are held whether to enter the ERM II as soon as 
at the accession to the EU, or postpone this decision. An issue on an optimal path and a 
speed of the changeover into euro, as it seems, is not agreed yet in the particular candidate 
countries. However, a prompt entrance to ERM II prevails. It means a fulfilment of the 
exchange rate and other Maastricht criteria in first two years after accession. It is then 
worthwhile noting that the Maastricht Treaty does not specify any mandatory timetable 
for that. Conversely, it leaves that decision to a given member state depending on its 
assessment of a state of preparation of all the economy. So, the first years after accession 
should be devoted for completion and consolidation of the integration in the internal 
market as well as the implementation of the relevant parts of EMU’s macroeconomic 
framework. 
 
The new member states will meet a much stricter environment that during the pre-
accession period. The macroeconomic policy options compatible with above framework of 
the new “member state with a derogation” could be severely limited, in particular if the 
country aims at a prompt adoption of the euro
7. A member state will be of course still free 
in its monetary and fiscal policy. However, the aspiration to adopt the euro will push the 
national central bank to define price stability as its overriding goal in order to meet the 
Treaty criteria on inflation and interest rate. Fiscal policy, under these constrains could 
become unduly restrictive, in order to avoid an excessive deficit while still having to bear 
                                                 
7 ibidem 
58 the burden of any adjustments necessary to catch up process, external imbalances, external 
shocks or simply reversible capital movements. 
 
It is then apparent that the most important period for any candidate country will start 
just after its accession but will not finish automatically after adoption the euro. The 
attempts to comply with the EMU acquis can imply substantial changes in the institutional 
macroeconomic framework in majority of candidate countries. We can say that the 
budgetary policy will play a crucial role in this process. Fiscal adjustment will be the key 
instrument to contain internal and external imbalances given the freedom of capital flows, 
the aim of the independent monetary authorities towards price stability and the progressive 
reduction in the flexibility of exchange rate policy. In this context, the Stability and 
Growth Pact will play a crucial role in the policies of these countries. 
 
The Pact strengthened the Treaty provisions on fiscal discipline in EMU, even for 
“member states with a derogation”. According to Art. 121, while qualifying for euro 
adoption requires only a sustainable reduction of the fiscal deficit below 3% of GDP, the 
candidate country should also plan to reach a budgetary position meeting the Pact’s 
requirements in the medium term. 
 
The Pact also envisages the annual submission and evaluation of medium-term 
macroeconomic programmes or updates
8. It means that a candidate country will be 
expected to submit a convergence programme to the Commission. Then, based on a 
Commission recommendation and within the multilateral surveillance framework, the 
Council will perform the examination on a level of medium-term budget deficit but also – 
whether the programme facilitates the closer co-ordination of economic policies and is 
consistent with the broad economic policy guidelines envisaged by Art. 99. 
 
According to the declaration in the Pact, when examining and monitoring the stability 
or convergence programmes, the Council should take into account the relevant cyclical and 
structural characteristics of the economy of each member state. It means that: 
                                                 
8 ibidem 
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adjusted budget figures 
•  A distinction between what is required to meet “close-to balance or in surplus” 
requirement and what would be most appropriate. Accordingly, member states can 
go beyond reaching a budget position that only provides a safety margin for cyclical 
economic developments 
•  When determining their medium-term fiscal target, member states should also take 
into account the need to cope with unforeseen budgetary risk, run down high debt 
ratios at a fast pace, prepare for the budgetary impact of ageing populations, and 
create room for appropriate discretionary fiscal policy. 
 
Appropriate fiscal policy will remain a challenging task for candidate countries after the 
accession. The public finances of the new member states will have to cope with substantial 
expenditure pressures. It will result in the following outcomes
9: 
•  Participation in the process of EU multilateral surveillance will considerably 
strengthen the external discipline imposed upon accessing countries’ policy-makers. 
By providing a credible mechanism for the establishment, assessment and 
monitoring of medium-term policy commitments, the EU surveillance procedures 
will offer to the acceding countries a useful device to support the implementation of 
the complex structural reforms needed, to provide an anchor to market’s 
expectations, and to adjust to shocks within a medium-term horizon. However, 
although imposing such discipline is beneficial in general, one could consider 
whether EU budgetary rules, under some conditions, might impose too tight a set 
of constrains, in the first years after accession. 
•  It can be argued that the Pact’s medium-term objective of budgetary positions close 
to balance or in surplus is too demanding for countries where a certain amount of 
deficit financing would seem unavoidable, given the size of expected reforms or 
unanticipated shocks and higher volatility of output. The excessive deficit ceiling 
might be regarded as too hard to achieve. A higher vulnerability to shocks and the 
ensuing need for frequent fiscal policy adjustments would violate the deficit ceiling 
                                                 
9 ibidem 
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though a multi-annual cyclically adjusted planning will be the best option. 
•  The above consideration could suggest that, for some time after accession, the strict 
application of the Pact would require a structural surplus of some magnitude in 
some new member states, in order to stay within the 3% ceiling, or a rather long 
definition of the “medium-term” to attain the targets. Implementing the EU 
framework for budgetary surveillance taking into account the specific needs and 
circumstances of some accession countries will be the responsibility of the EU 
multilateral surveillance and policy co-ordination actors. 
 
Table 1. 
General government net borrowing (-) / lending (+) of the candidate countries 





















































The above table gives a comparison of a deficit level in all the candidate countries. 
We can see that Estonia is the only accession country that has managed to work out a 
budgetary surplus. Having in mind that the accession countries will have to accelerate their 
pace of growth it is also known that the growth enhancing expenditure strategy should 
focus on education, transport network and environmental programmes but also on social 
systems. These are the preconditions jeopardising the aim of meeting the 3% ceiling. They 
also force the national governments to even stricter fiscal policy and deficit planning. For 
example, the Polish government has started to increase expenditure annually by the level of 
a projected inflation rate + 1% above the inflation level. The design of the state budget 
takes into consideration the economic conditions and does not focus exclusively on a 
deficit target.  The efforts are made also to attract the private capital to finance the projects 
formerly of the exclusive responsibility of the central government. 
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The way to consolidation of the state budgets within EU prior to the euro seemed, 
however, equally difficult. The prevailing budget deficit in all the countries has been 
corrected in several ways. Four countries (Belgium, Ireland, Austria and Portugal) have 
relied essentially on tax increases. The Nordic countries and the United Kingdom carried 
out their fiscal consolidation though sizeable cuts in government spending, with either 
very limited increases in tax revenue or even with reduction in taxation. In Finland and 
Sweden the pronounced cut in spending followed an expansionary policy during the period 
1991 – 93. Therefore, the spending cuts helped to restore “normal” spending levels. In the 
rest of the countries, a kind of “switching” strategy prevailed. Their consolidation period 
consisted of two phases. The first one – the substantial increase in taxation with rather 
limited reduction in spending (or even increase). In the second phase of the adjustment, 
substantial expenditure cuts were implemented, while tax revenue grew much less or even 
declined. The achievements of the EMU countries bring us to the conclusion on the 
unsustainability of further tax increases and on the need to put public spending firmly 
under control. The observation can be supported with other conclusion: the better and 
quicker budget consolidation depends directly from the state of the development of 
national capital markets easing the burden of financing from the government budget. 
 
The Maastricht Treaty offers no special provisions for the monetary policies of the 
selected countries during the interim period between EU accession and adoption of the 
single currency. As is the case throughout so called the second stage (stipulated in the 
Treaty) the member states still treat their exchange rate policies as a matter of common 
interest (Art. 109 m), but the monetary policies of the participating countries formally 
remain the responsibility of the national authorities. However, it is necessary to stress that 
in the central banks’ policy formulation, the weight of “common interest” increases, 
relative to domestic considerations, during the final run-up to EMU. 
 
The need for closer co-ordination arises from several reasons. First, the market will 
closer observe any of serious disagreements about the appropriate direction of monetary 
policy what could destabilise exchange rates during the final period. Second, it is very 
important to have an exchange rate of any pre-EMU country on the level very close to the 
62 desirable from EMU perspective. That is why the pre-accession countries have to consider 
carefully all the pros and cons of joining quickly the Eurozone and its impact on their 
economy.  From the technical point of view, they have to make the examination on the 
similarities and discrepancies in the following areas: 
•  Exchange rate regime or regulations in capital flows. A fixed exchange rate regime 
limits substantially the effectiveness of monetary policy. Conversely, in a floating 
rate regime changes in interest rates will give rise to capital flows and to exchange 
rate movements. Regulations or other barriers to capital flows may modify the 
above relationships and would have the negative repercussions for the economy. 
•  Financial structure. Among the most important characteristics that can influence 
the impact of monetary policy are: the degree of competition within the banking 
system and between banks and other financial institutions; the share of bank credit 
in total financing; the development of modern financial techniques as securitisation; 
the credit maturity; the relationship between the banking system and the corporate 
sector; the ownership in the banking system; the degree of internationalisation of 
the banking system and foreign currency holdings; households’ access to the credit 
market; the existence of credit access constraints for certain agents; the balance sheet 
configurations of financial and non-financial agents, the financing of the public 
sector and the maturity structure of public debt. 
•  Labour market structure. The effectiveness of monetary policy is higher the quicker 
a given final target (typically price stability) is achieved and the less it costs in terms 
of output losses. In other words, different degrees of flexibility in labour market can 
account for a different impact of monetary policy. 
•  Sectoral composition of output. Differences in this area may account for a 
significant part of the measured differential effects of monetary policy. 
 
As stated at the EU summit in Nice in 2000, the assumed time horizon for EU 
enlargement is the year 2004. It is then worthwhile to analyse the present state and the 
prospects for the economies of future member states – Czech Republic and Poland. An 
integral part of these countries’ accession to the EU is the obligation of subsequently 
joining the Eurozone. What will be the effects for the new member states and the “old” 
ones after full adoption of the single currency? 
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The Economic and Monetary Union was implemented in three stages on the basis of 
Maastricht Treaty. In 1999, eleven countries satisfied the conditions for adopting the single 
currency and consequently established the Eurozone. When they joint the EU
10, the new 
member states will automatically participate in the third stage of EMU. As it has been 
stated above, they will acquire the status of “member state with a derogation” regarding the 
adoption of the euro. Upon UE accession, the central banks of new member states will 
become members of the European System of Central Banks. After they adopt the euro, 
these central banks will become parts of the Eurosystem. 
 
Under the EU legislation, prior to adopting the euro any candidate state must be an EU 
member state and must have fulfilled the Maastricht convergence criteria, including 
compatibility between their legal rules and EU law on EMU. The convergence required for 
entering the Eurozone is assessed according to the procedure laid down in the Treaty 
establishing the European Community. The final decision is subsequently made by a 
summit of EU member states acting on the recommendation of the ECOFIN Council
11. 
Those member states whose economic conditions are assessed as a potential threat to the 
maintenance of price stability in the Eurozone will not joint the monetary union and will 
retain the status of member state with derogation. 
 
The criterion on exchange rate stability requires two-years participation in the ERM II. 
The central parity and fluctuation band of the exchange rate regime within the ERM II will 
– after being agreed upon between a central bank of a given member state and its 
government – be discussed with the ECB and the Commission and subsequently approved 
by the ECOFIN Council. Staying in the ERM II for longer than the minimum required 
period is not deemed desirable. 
 
The positive effects of a particular member state entry into the Eurozone are as follows: 
•  It will be a completion of the country’s integration into European monetary structures. 
The new member states in the Eurozone will be able to participate fully in formulating 
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64 and implementing the single European monetary and exchange rate policy, which aims 
to strengthen macroeconomic stability in Europe. 
•  It should have positive impacts on domestic economic policy, since the key elements of 
the system are a requirement for balanced public budgets in the medium term and a 
requirement to undertake structural reforms supporting sustainable economic growth. 
•  Fiscal policy implemented in accordance with the Stability and Growth Pact, coupled 
with a decline in the risk premium, will lead to stabilisation of long-term interest rates 
at a low level. Corporations and households will profit not only from the low interest 
rates but also from access to the deeper, more liquid and more transparent Eurozone 
capital markets. 
•  The irrevocable fixing of the currency within EMU will increase the stability of the 
financial sector and reduce the risks of monetary turbulence.  
•  The domestic enterprise sector in particular will profit from the elimination of 
exchange rate risks vis-a-vis the Eurozone countries, which are the most important 
trading partners of the new member states. These benefits will show up as a decline in 
transaction and hedging costs and a reduction in investment uncertainty. The 
household sector will profit from greater price transparency that stimulates 
competition. 
•  These positive effects will foster a more stable environment for entrepreneurship, more 
efficient allocation of resources and subsequently higher economic growth. Eurozone 
membership will thus further speed up the real convergence of the new member states’ 
economies towards the EU average. 
 
On their way to the Eurozone, however, the new member states should also take some 
possible barriers and risks into consideration. These risks are connected primarily with the 
response of the economy to economic disturbances under the irrevocably fixed exchange 
rate within the Eurozone. In the event of insufficient cyclical and structural alignment of 
the new member states’ economies and their financial sectors with the Eurozone 
economies, economic shocks may have unequal and asymmetric impacts in different 
regions. The cessation of an independent monetary policy able to respond flexibly to such 
shocks constitutes a challenge for fiscal policy and for the functionality of natural 
65 adjustment mechanisms, especially on the labour marker. The barriers to fast entry into 
the Eurozone may thus be as follows: 
•  Insufficient alignment of the new member state’s economy with the Eurozone 
economies in the real and financial spheres – the characteristics of the accessing 
economies are gradually converging towards those of the EU member states. Trade 
with the EU in both countries accounts for about two-thirds of their total foreign 
trade, and the inflow of foreign direct investment from the EU (although somehow 
slowing down in Poland) constitute an important part of all the investments flowing to 
their economies. It is however apparent that the cyclical development of their 
economies is less aligned with the cyclical trend in the Eurozone than is that of the 
average Eurozone member state. 
•  Low fiscal policy flexibility – the large budget deficits in both countries, together with 
the built-in trends towards a further structural widening of those deficits and 
inadequate conditions for the symmetrical functioning of automatic stabilisers, 
represent a serious barrier to effective fiscal stabilisation policy. The aim of fiscal 
consolidation must be not only to fulfil the Maastricht criteria but also to achieve in 
the medium term balanced public finance budget facilitating the effective action of 
automatic stabilisers and flexibility of discretionary expenditure. In the future absence 
of an autonomous monetary policy, fiscal policy will – given the irrevocably fixed 
exchange rate within the Eurozone – be the key element of macroeconomic 
stabilisation. An insufficiently consolidated public finance system could have 
exceptionally adverse effects during these countries’ participation in the ERM II and 
during the first years after they join the Eurozone. During this period, the probability 
of their economic cycles diverging from that elsewhere in the Eurozone will be higher 
than during the later stage of integration. Moreover, given the unified nominal interest 
rates, the expected positive inflation differential between Poland and Czech Republic 
from one side and the Eurozone average from other, in this period will result in lower 
real interest rates which could trigger excessive growth in domestic demand. Therefore, 
in the years immediately following their entry into the Eurozone, prudential fiscal 
policy will be a key condition for maintaining stable economic growth.  
•  Insufficiently flexible labour market. Like the EU labour market, the Polish and Czech 
labour markets are characterised by relatively low mobility and flexibility of the labour 
66 force. Moreover, for several years following accession, restrictions on the free 
movement of labour from new member states will have to be reckoned with. To 
strengthen the adjustment mechanisms on the labour market, steps must be taken to 
increase the flexibility of the labour market and real wages not only in the institutional 
area but also in areas such as transport infrastructure and the housing market. 
 
The Czech Republic 
 
In its 2001 Regular Report, The European Commission found that “The Czech 
Republic is a functioning market economy. Provided it makes further progress towards medium-term fiscal 
consolidation and completes the implementation of structural reforms, it should be able to cope with the competitive 
pressure and market forces within the Union in a near term”
12. 
 
While the Czech Republic is called a good pupil among the accession countries it is 
still far from reaching the average indicators of the EU member states. The most apparent 
is lack of the real income convergence. In 2001 the average per capita income in purchasing 
power standards amounted to 57% of the EU average.. The economic activity rate has been 
at relatively high levels of around 71-72%. The unemployment rate was 8% in 2001 what 
was somehow above the EU average. 
 
The country has a well functioning market economy. Its efficiency is being 
supported by a well-developed financial sector and the absence of any significant barriers to 
market entry and exit. Policy co-ordination between the government and the Czech 
National Bank (CNB) works broadly well and the independence of the CNB has finally 
been enshrined. 
 
Prior to the recovery regained firmly in 2001 the economy had to go through its 
first post-transition crisis that has been provoked by macroeconomic imbalances coupled 
with substantial shortcomings on the microeconomic reform agenda. After 
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67 implementation of an austerity package beginning from 1999 the economy started to grow 
with the average yearly rate of 2.4%.  
 
Since 1998 the current account deficit has been financed by high inflows of foreign 
direct investments. Inflation targeting was introduced in 1998, with net inflation serving as 
the reference until 2001. With its “Setting of the Inflation Target for the Period 2002 to 
2005”, the CNB has embarked upon headline inflation targeting which helps ensure that 
the public accepts the targets. The inflation target is set as a band that should fall 
continuously to 2% to 4% in December 2005. Since its sharp depreciation in 1997, the 
Czech crown has shown an appreciating trend against the euro. In the light of the strong 
upward move of the exchange rate the government and the CNB agreed on a joint strategy 
to prevent a further strengthening of the Czech crown. This strategy aims at withholding 
foreign currency denominated public revenues, in particular privatisation receipts, from 
the market. 
 
Overall monetary policy has been accommodating since 1998. Policy rates have 
been cut several times. The real short-term interest rate for example has significantly been 
falling from around 11% to 0.5% in 2001. Monetary conditions reflect the low inflationary 
environment and the strong rate of the Czech currency. 
 
The state of the country public finances does not seem satisfactory. The general 
government deficit has averaged 3.8% of GDP from 1997 to 2001. In 2001 the deficit 
reached 5.5% of GDP and the end of 2002 this level was already around 6.6%. Mandatory 
and quasi mandatory expenditures of the state budget have increased by roughly 10 
percentage points of GDP since 1995 and account for about 80% of state budget spending. 
To cope with it the government has announced that in 2003 it will give priority to tax 
increases and to discretionary expenditure cut backs. However, without a completion of far 
reaching comprehensive reform this problem is unlikely to be solved in a medium term. 
 
General government debt ratio is low in “European terms”, i.e. 23.6% of GDP at 
the end of 2001 but the direction of its changes causes a concern – in 1998 it was only 
13.7%. Good progress has been made towards greater fiscal transparency and better fiscal 
68 management with the introduction of new budgetary rules in 2001. Still, however, because 
of the reforms needed a final fiscal position seems to be rather unpredictable. 
  
Because of the fact that the fiscal policy has become increasingly expansionary, the 
monetary policy, with the consensus between CNB and the government, has undertaken 
stronger efforts to secure macroeconomic stability. So, the macroeconomic policy mix is 
broadly adequate and the continuous high inflows of foreign capital – of which by far the 
majority is medium to long-term capital – seem to the convincing prove of it.   
 
Almost all measures leading to the open market economy have been already 
performed. The majority of prices for goods and services and the trade and foreign 
exchange regimes have been liberalised in the first half of 1990s. The private sector is firmly 
established and accounts for the overwhelming part of the economy. The privatisation 
process is close to completion apart from some strategic enterprises in the corporate sector 
waiting for a change of ownership. Market entry and exit mechanisms are already in place, 
while they have to be improved in order to make economy more efficient. Property rights 
are established and transferable.  
 
Privatisation and consolidation have laid the foundations for a solid financial sector 
that is able to fulfil its intermediation role. This sector consists mainly of banks and the 
overall health in the banking sector has been improved substantially over time. However, 
over the last years, the credit-to-GDP ratio declined from 58.5% at the end of 1998 to 
47.5% at the end of 2001. The decline in business lending can partly be explained 
statistically by the transfer of bad assets from the banking sector to the state’s bail out 
institution, but it is also due to the implementation of stricter risk assessments thereby 
putting an end to the past lending activities of banks not always fully based on through 
commercial considerations. In Czech banking sector a foreign capital predominates with 
more than 90% of total assets in all banking sector.  
 
The non-bank financial sector is still relatively small but stands ready to play a 
bigger role in intermediation. However, there are signs of the marginalisation of Czech 
capital markets due to disadvantageous economic conditions: market capitalisation of the 
69 equity market plunged from roughly 29.5% of GDP in 1997 to a mere 15.7% of GDP in 
2001. The development of this market is hampered by low liquidity reflecting both 
demand and supply shortcomings on the domestic equity markets. The bond market has 
developed better and comprises a sizeable volume of corporate bonds and government 
bonds, Capitalisation in this market amounted to 14.9% of GDP in 2001, up from 10.4% of 
GDP in 1997
13. Commercial banks represent by far the biggest group of investors in the 
bond market. 
 
                                                 
13 ibidem 
70 Table 2. 
Selected Macroeconomic and Financial Indicators for the Czech Republic
14 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 
I. Real  Sector 
Real GDP growth (in %) 
Real growth of exports of goods and services (in %) 
Investment (in % of GDP) 
Unemployment rate 
Inflation (CPI, period average, annual change in %) 
Real exchange rate against the euro (change in %) 
II. External  Sector 
Current account balance (in % of GDP) 
Foreign direct investment inflows (net, in % of GDP) 
Portfolio investment (in % of GDP) 
Other investment – short term (in % of GDP) 
Gross external debt (in % of GDP) 
Gross external debt (in % of exports of goods and services) 
Short-term gross external debt (in % of total gross external debt) 
Gross official reserves (in months of imports of goods and services 
Gross official reserves (in % of gross short-term debt) 
III. Fiscal  Sector 
General government balance (in % of GDP) 
General government debt (in % of GDP) 
IV.  Monetary and Financial Sector 
Bank assets (in % of GDP) 
Deposits (in % of GDP) 
Domestic credit to private sector (in % of GDP) 
Nominal domestic credit growth (in % over the last 12 months) 
Share of majority state-owned banks in total bank assets (in %) 
Share of majority foreign-owned banks in total bank assets (in %) 
Aggregate capital adequacy of banks (in %) 
Non-performing bank loans (in % of total bank loans) 
Pre-tax bank profits (in % of total bank loans) 
Foreign-currency denominated assets (in % of foreign-currency denominated 
liabilities) 
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71 Sharp fluctuations in the exchange rate present a significant threat to a small open 
economy in an environment of liberalised capital flows. Coupled with some imbalances in 
monetary and fiscal policy such an environment could be a threat of serious shocks. 
However, certain circumstances could serve as assistance in a way to the eurozone. The 
pace of growth is here a key element. The medium-term macroeconomic scenario has 
suggested that if there are no substantial changes, particularly in foreign demand, then the 
Czech economy will fluctuate within an economic growth trajectory of 3% to 4%, with a 
slight acceleration tendency.  
 
In the medium horizon, the inflation rate is expected to fluctuate around 4%. 
Having in mind that the more intense dialogue between the Czech central bank and the 
government has improved the conditions for forming a desirable mix of monetary and 
fiscal policy, it should have a positive effect on inflation expectations and costs’ reduction 
of anti-inflationary policy. 
 
The steps of the process of consolidation of public finances should be implemented 
gradually over time without having negative effects on the performance of the Czech 
economy or on its real convergence. In addition to standard policies (adjustments on the 
expenditure and revenue side of general government budget) fiscal policy also bears the 
costs of completing the transformation process and creating conditions for the real 
convergence of the Czech economy and the pre-accession costs of harmonising policies and 
institutions. This combination of factors limits the rate at which government expenditures 
to GDP are reduced. 
 
In the medium term, subsidies to transformation institutions will gradually 
decrease. The general government deficit excluding net lending is supposed to decrease over 
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In its Regular Report from 2001 the Commission has expressed a similar opinion 
about Poland as about Czech Republic cited above: Poland is a functioning market economy. 
Provided that it continues and intensifies its present reform efforts in a consistent policy environment, it should be 
able to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the Union, in the near term. 
 
As in the Czech Republic, in Poland the impressive track record of economic 
growth since the mid-1990s has been interrupted by the sharp slowdown in activity 
experienced since 2001. The positive side-effect of the slowdown has been the correction of 
a number of macroeconomic imbalances that had arisen as a result of strong domestic 
demand. With the downturn, high unemployment and inactivity have become the main 
imbalances in the Polish economy. 
 
Prior to the 2001 downturn, Poland was slowly but steadily catching up with the 
EU in terms of income. GDP per head in purchasing power standards now represents 
around 40% of the EU average. At present, because of slowing economic activity the 
employment rate has fallen from around 59% in 1997 to 53,8% in 2001. 
 
Similarly as in the case of Czech Republic, Poland also has already performed a 
majority of steps necessary to create an open market economy. One, however, can see 
some barriers for the further smooth pace of development.  In the recent years the 
consensus on macroeconomic policies has weakened. There has been an increasing 
divergence of views between the monetary authorities and the government that has led to a 
sub-optimal macroeconomic mix and a further breakdown in co-operation. This situation 
is being mirrored in weakening investor confidence and the decreasing attractiveness of the 
Polish economy. 
 
The downturn starting in the second half of 2000 led to a weak growth rate of just 
1.1% in 2001 and 0.5% in the first quarter of 2002. The current account balance has been 
showing continuous deficits of at least 4% of GDP, which have been increasingly financed 
by FDI inflows. Inflation has been on a falling trend. Whereas annual inflation in 1997 still 
73 amounted to 15%, it has fairly continuously fallen over the past years. Headline inflation 
dropped to 3.5% at end-2001. 
 
Poland has switched its exchange rate regime from a crawling peg prevailing until 
2000 to a regime of free float since then. Since the exit of the crawling peg in April 2000, 
Poland has been maintaining a monetary and exchange rate policy framework combining a 
floating exchange rate with direct inflation targeting. Implementation of direct inflation 
targeting is proving difficult, in particular because of the uncertainties and lags surrounding 
the monetary policy transmission mechanism, given the state of development in the 
financial sector. Since the flotation of the zloty, the monetary authorities refrained from 
direct intervention in the foreign exchange market, as this would probably have bring little 
effect on the currency’s real value and could only have been undertaken at the cost of 
higher inflation. 
 
Poland’s efforts of fiscal consolidations cannot be described as a big success because 
of a slowdown in growth and the reluctance of the Polish authorities to undertake a deep 
restructuring of public expenditures. General government net borrowing dropped from 
4.3% of GDP in 1997 to levels of around or below 2% in the subsequent three years but has 
widened significantly in last years, parallel to the slowdown of economic activity. Most of 
the deterioration of the fiscal accounts is attributable to the deficit of the central 
government budget. Reforms in health care and pensions, which were initiated in 1999, 
have still not been completed. 
 
After a policy mix in mid nineties that enabled economic growth and stability, this 
policy mix has become less supportive since 1999. After a sharp easing of monetary policy 
in 1999 and a rapid pick up in inflation and in the current account deficit, macroeconomic 
policies were considerably tightened in 2000. Since then, the relaxation of monetary policy 
has been lagging while the deterioration of the fiscal stance in the course of 2001 has gone 
beyond cyclical factors and reflects a discretionary relaxation of policy. The lack of 
transparency in the fiscal accounts is also an obstacle to the appropriate setting of monetary 
policy. 
 
74 Poland has conducted a liberalisation of most of the prices very early in the 
transition. Trade liberalisation has been guided by WTO and EU accession-related 
commitments that have enabled a fall in Poland’s effective trade-weighted average tariff 
from 5.8% in 1997 to 2.6% in 2001.  
 
There are no significant legal or institutional barriers to the establishment of new 
firms in Poland. The main remaining problem is the implementation of bankruptcy 
procedures and the exit of insolvent firms but the new law is due to be implemented later 
in 2003. 
 
The financial sector is maturing slowly. The government maintains ownership in 
only 7 institutions compared to 15 in 1997 but the role of the former state savings bank – 
PKO BP – remains significant. The market is also fairly concentrated, with the largest 10 
banks accounting for more than 70% of assets. Polish banking intermediation remains 
characterised by a lack of effective competition. However, the sector seems stable and well 
capitalised. Efficiency of banking intermediation, measured in terms of interest rate spreads 
remains low and is improving only slowly. 
 
The non- banking financial sector is relatively small, but growing rapidly. The 
Polish equity market is still very small with a capitalisation of less than 15% of GDP. The 
corporate bond market (as well as other fixed income markets) is also small but should now 
develop in parallel with the growth of institutional investors. The commercial paper 
market is expanding rapidly and becoming an alternative source of financing for the biggest 
firms. 
75 Table 3. 
Selected Macroeconomic and Financial Indicators for Poland
16 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 
I. Real  Sector 
Real GDP growth (in %) 
Real growth of exports of goods and services (in %) 
Investment (in % of GDP) 
Unemployment rate 
Inflation (CPI, period average, annual change in %) 
Real effective exchange rate (towards EU-15 and 8 other industrialised countries 
(change in %) 
II. External  Sector 
Current account balance (in % of GDP) 
Foreign direct investment inflows (net, in % of GDP) 
Portfolio investment (in % of GDP) 
  0/w inward portfolio investment (net, in % of GDP) 
Long-term investment (net, in % of GDP) 
Other investment – short term (net, in % of GDP) 
Gross external debt (in % of GDP) 
Gross external debt (in % of exports of goods and non-factor services) 
Short-term gross external debt (in % of GDP, remaining maturity) 
Gross official reserves (in months of imports of goods and services 
Gross official reserves (in % of gross short-term debt, remaining maturity) 
III. Fiscal  Sector 
General government balance (in % of GDP) 
General government debt (in % of GDP) 
IV.  Monetary and Financial Sector 
Bank assets (in % of GDP) 
Deposits (in % of GDP) 
Domestic credit to private sector (in % of GDP) 
Nominal domestic credit growth (in %, annual, end-period) 
Share of majority state-owned banks in total bank assets (in %) 
Share of majority foreign-owned banks in total bank assets (in %) 
Aggregate capital adequacy of banks (in %) 
Non-performing bank loans (in % of total bank loans) 
Pre-tax bank profits (in % of total bank loans) 
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76 Before entering the Eurozone both countries have to fulfil certain preconditions to 
ensure that the positive effects really materialise and the potential risks of Eurozone 
membership are minimised. In the ERM II exchange rate regime and after the subsequent 
adoption of the euro, when the analysed countries will give up their autonomous monetary 
policy, sufficient alignment of their economies with the Eurozone economies in the real 
and financial spheres, flexible fiscal policy and a well-functioning labour market will be of 
key importance for the smooth functioning of their economies.  
In Poland we can find a lot of academics and the representatives of central 
institutions suggesting that the only Polish way to the Eurozone could be so called 
“euroization”. This term describes one-side replacement of the Polish currency by the euro 
during the interim period preceding the full adoption of the single currency. Technically, it 
will be performed in a way of buying the euro coins and banknotes in the market and all 
the invoices, bonds, banking accounts etc. would be converted into euro in a due time. 
Supporters of such a solution argument that it would further attract the foreign capital, 
reduce the costs of transactions and the final effect would be an augmentation of 
manufactory volumes and a stabilisation of prices. 
 
One-side euroization is not, however, a process supported by the EU 
representatives. High level of deficit precludes a success of euroization. Poland would not 
be able to conduct an independent monetary policy with the aim of curbing inflation. 
Poland would then become a victim of so called Balassa – Samuelson effect
17. Having a 
fixed exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro Poland would experience the inflation rate higher that 
in the Eurozone. At present, having a floated exchange rate Poland can rather easily fight 
with the B-S effect, for example by permitting zloty to appreciate as a result of restrictive 
monetary policy and – in this way – meet the inflationary criterion. Conversely, having a 
fixed exchange rate means that all the process of combating inflation would have to be 
conducted by government. In the light of the known problems with the central budget 
consolidation it seems to be impossible.  
 
                                                 
17 In a country where a productivity growth is rate is very high, the prices of services grow much quicker that the 
prices of tradable goods. 
77 In the document „Partnership for the accession in the EU” agreed with the 
representatives of the European Union in spring 1998 and describing priorities to be 
executed by Poland in the pre-accession period, one could find also recommendations on 
preparation of Poland to the membership in the Eurozone. It was stated that “Poland will 
not enter the Eurozone immediately after gaining the membership in the EU. Conversely, 
it will conduct policy with an aim to achieve a real convergence with European goals on 
macroeconomic and social cohesion as well as a nominal convergence leading to the single 
currency”. 
 
  Programme „Agenda 2000” published in December 1997 stresses that to the aim of 
effective monetary policy within EMU, Poland has in advance to conduct and conclude 
necessary reforms that would eliminate factors hindering an execution of the efficient 
monetary policy, i.e. for example lack of a level playing field in the banking sector and low 
degree of the financial market development. In „Agenda 2000” it was also emphasised that 
it would be of the crucial importance for Poland to meet convergence criteria and to 




The future member states, in particular first five: Poland, Hungary, Czech 
Republic, Slovenia and Estonia meet already better the convergence criteria that it was the 
case of the Southern member states in 1999. 
 
The governor of the National Bank of Poland supports the view that the Polish way 
to the single currency should be preceded by structural reforms, changes in tax regime, 
liberalisation of the labour code, budget discipline, restructuring of some industrial sectors, 
development of the transport networks, completion of the privatisation process and 
changes in social security system. 
 
Frequently cited Reports of the Commission stress that it takes a lot of time before 
the new member states will catch the EU standards of living. They present the opinion that 
the countries entering the EU in 2004 should not insist on a prompt adoption of the single 
78 currency. The euro should not be treated as a priority for the countries lagging for some 20 
years with reaching the same average of economic indices as it is the case of the present EU 
member states. The European Central Bank strongly displays its opposition. It shows a 
concern that too rapid implementation of the euro in these countries could threaten a 
stability of the single currency. European Commission recommends that these countries 
should take as a priority a diminishing of a distance in their development, not a restrictive 
exchange rate and monetary policy resulting from standards in Eurozone. Daniel Gros, 
director of Centre for European Policy Research in Brussels states that „it is necessary to 
assume that Central and East European countries at a moment of entering the Eurozone 
will be in average more poor that those of European Union. However, having in mind the 
experience of Portugal, Greece and Spain is it possible that the growth rate of CCE 
countries will accelerate when they become the new member states of EMU. In this way 
these countries will also accelerate the average growth rate in all the Eurozone. In other 
words, it means that the broadened Eurozone in, say, 2006 with the participation of some 
ECC countries should be more dynamic that would justify higher interest rates. These two 
elements, higher growth rate and higher interest rates will result in the stronger euro. So, 
the euro should strengthen after bringing some new countries to the Eurozone, assuming 
that those new countries will have a high growth rate and a strong fiscal position”. 
 
It is very difficult to predict the effects of any shocks that could happen in any of 
the three distinct phases: the pre-Maastricht phase, the Maastricht phase and the 
enlargement after the accession of ten countries. These effects depend on whether they are 
symmetric or country-specific
18. If supply shocks are symmetric, the response of inflation 
and output in the enlarged currency area is very similar to that of the euro area before 
enlargement, while the response in accession countries is sensitive to the slope of the 
Philips curve. 
 
In the pre-accession phase, as it was described above, a stable state inflation in any 
accession country depends on the monetary policy framework. With a floating exchange 
rate inflation will be higher, the less credible the monetary policy framework and the 
                                                 
18 The admission of accession countries to an enlarged monetary union: a tentative assessment, European Central 
Bank, Working Paper Series, February 2003. 
79 flatter the Phillips curve, Still, there is more room to manoeuvre for the policy mix. With a 
currency anchored to, say, the euro inflation is partly imported from the Eurozone and 
partly determined by the process of real exchange rate appreciation (B – S effect). 
 
In the Maastricht phase and some requirements resulting from both internal (within 
a given country) and external (the EU conditions) environment the inflationary 
expectations start to be formed in a dramatically different way leading to the nominal 
convergence objective. During this phase one can observe however some upward pressures 
on the nominal exchange rate. 
 
What it there going to happen with a steady state inflation after a given country 
enters the third phase? It seems that after a new member state adopts the convergence 
monetary policy, the inflationary impact should be negligible. Similarly, the real exchange 
rate appreciation will have in a long run a small, if any, influence on aggregate inflation in 
the Eurozone. Its impact can be felt, however, in the short term. That impact will depend 
on a real appreciation and on a size of a given country. 
 
Summing up, time series observed in the accession countries are not of the 
appropriate length to serve as an evidence of the desirable development of the results of 
policy mix implemented in these countries. The flood in the Czech Republic, political 
uncertainty in Poland, prolonged downturn in all candidate countries could be recalled as 
an explanation of difficulties in any predictions. Still, it seems to be rather apparent that at 
the present stage – at the edge of accession – the candidate countries should concentrate 
firmly on a fiscal side of their policy mix. They have already reached a satisfactory level of 
inflation, even better that in some Eurozone member states. It is then the final and the 
only period for them to consolidate their budget deficits, even at the slight cost of inflation. 
As long as there are some discrepancies between the overall state of their economies and 
the ones of the Eurozone, the candidate states should not insist on an early access to the 
ERM II, still trying to harmonise their monetary policies with that conducted by ESCB. 
 
As it has been stated at the beginning of this report, the Eurozone cannot be called 
an optimal currency zone in theoretical terms. Notwithstanding, because of some practical 
80 evidence, the enlarged monetary union in Europe will work well provided the continuous 
fiscal and monetary discipline in participating countries. The longer it exists, the more 
apparent will be the positive effects of its creation: strengthening economic cohesion, 
reduction in risk premia, facilitation foreign direct investments and encouraging 
technological progress. 
81 IV.  Monetary policy in Poland in perspective of accession to the EMU 




Poland is on the eve of joining the European Union, an event that over time should greatly 
contribute to the development of the Polish economy. Having achieved that goal gives rise 
to another challenge to be faced up to, namely meeting the requirements of eligibility for 
prospective euro-zone membership. Focusing on this aim will largely determine the 
monetary policy conduct in the forthcoming years. And thus, in light of various changes 
the European integration entails with respect to the real economy and simultaneous 
necessity to meet the Maastricht nominal criteria, an effort to assess the potential impact of 
new economic conditions on the monetary policy performance is by all means desirable. 
Therefore, this paper makes an attempt to scrutinize distinct factors that might influence 
policy makers’ decisions. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. At the very beginning, a quick glance at the path 
of the disinflation process is given. It provides a reader with a rough overview of 
developments that impinged on the relationships between the monetary and fiscal 
authorities, and thus influenced the monetary policy conduct. This constitutes a starting 
point for the analysis of the rationale behind the current strategy of the Monetary Policy 
Council (MPC), which is discussed next. This, in turn, gives rise to the development of the 
most important phenomena that might have an impact on the monetary policy conduct in 
the early stage of Poland’s membership in the European Union. At this stage, a particular 
emphasis is placed on the Balassa-Samuelson effect and the way it may influence inflation 
targeting. Moving forward, as participation within the ERM II framework constitutes a 
prerequisite for euro-zone membership, the ins and outs of this mechanism, and - more 
generally - of the quasi-fixed exchange rate regimes, are brought to light. While developing 
potential sources of capital movements experienced by the accession countries (ACs), the 
issue of convergence play is touched upon. Setting the pros and cons of the ERM II against 
those of the floating exchange rate system provides support for the MPC’s decision to 
maintain the current regime. Further, the relationship between the nominal and real 
exchange rate is discussed, with particular stress laid on the importance of setting the 
  82 central parity within the ERM II at the level consistent with the real equilibrium exchange 
rate. Next, an overview of the Maastricht criteria challenges is made in parallel with 
focusing on the potential trade-off between the real and nominal convergence. Then, the 
authors make an attempt to refute various allegations quoted by the opponents of Poland’s 
early entry into the euro-zone. Finally, envisaged sequence of events subsequent to 
Poland’s euro-zone memberships is fleshed out, with an emphasis put on the potential 
threat related to the overheating phenomenon.  
 
1.  From disinflation path to the stage of stabilizing inflation – the Polish 
experience 
 
The year 2003 completes the stage set by the Medium term monetary policy strategy for the years 1999-
2003 and gives rise to another one, whose framework has been determined in the recently 
published Monetary policy strategy beyond 2003. The new strategy also marks a shift from the 
disinflation path to stabilizing inflation at the low level. This is not to say, however, that 
the process of reducing inflation from a high level of 8.6% (YoY) in December 1998 to 
0.4% in May 2003 has been carried out smoothly with no tensions encountered over time.  
It is enough to go back to the fiscal turmoil in 1999, whose underlying cause was the Social 
Security Fund breakdown, an event resulting from the temporary loss of control over the 
inflow of social security contributions
1. Consequently, an unexpected increase in fiscal 
expenditure (structural deficit increased to above 5% of GDP in 1999 – European 
Commission, 2002a), combined with earlier relaxation of the monetary stance, poor 
external demand and negative supply shocks, led to a surge in inflation (Figure 1) and 
deterioration of the current account deficit. This event impinged on the relationships 
between the central bank and fiscal authorities for the next few years. The policy-mix 
improvement was further protracted by insufficient fiscal consolidation and fiscal policy 
relaxation reflected, inter alia, in two revisions to the budget in 2001 or a continuing increase 
in government expenditure relative to GDP. Mutual distrust between the fiscal and 
monetary authorities have further been fuelled by government officials’ critical comments 
                                                 
1 This and the following paragraph largely draw on Rozkrut (2003b) 
  83 on the monetary policy conduct, or pressures exerted on the NBP to release resources 
classified as for exchange-rate risk provisions. 
The above-outlined circumstances seem to justify, at least to a certain extent, a cautious 
attitude adopted by the MPC towards the conduct of the monetary policy, reflected in a 
series of interest rate increases and a subsequent series of careful reductions (Figure 1). The 
NBP’s conservative strategy, however, came in for severe criticism, reinforced by the fact 
that since 1999 all the inflation goals have been either overshot or undershot (Figure 1). 
Notwithstanding that, fulfillment of the medium-term inflation target of below 4% at the 
end of 2003 can almost be taken for granted, which in turn should enhance the NBP’s 
credibility. All in all, the completion of the disinflation path should not be underestimated, 
although one might have reservations about the way it has been attained.  
 















I nf l at i on  ( LHS) MPC  Tar get   ( LHS)





2.  Towards the euro-zone – monetary policy strategy 
  84  
In the Monetary policy strategy beyond 2003 the Monetary Policy Council (MPC) have taken a 
stand that direct inflation targeting (DIT), remaining at the core of the NBP’s policy since 
1999, should be continued.  An increasing number of countries adopting inflation targeting 
(IT) (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001; Fracasso et al., 2003) seems to support the virtues 
of the policy conduct based on that strategy. First of all, it enhances transparency of the 
monetary policy by presenting the monetary policy goal in an explicit and understandable 
manner. Secondly, its openness allows public verification of monetary policy directions 
and effectiveness of the policy conduct. Furthermore, under IT strategy a central bank, 
provided that it possesses sufficient credibility, may influence significantly inflationary 
expectations, one of the crucial factors that determine the actual inflation path. Last but 
not least, IT provides a central bank with a greater flexibility for the use of monetary 
instruments that may be tailored to the specific nature of the shock that might jeopardize 
the achievement of the inflation target.  
A new medium-term inflation target has been defined in the Monetary policy strategy beyond 2003 
(NBP, 2003a) as a CPI year-on-year increase of 2.5% +/- 1 p.p. As distinct from the so-far 
inflation targets verified once a year in December, the new one is to be scrutinized on a 
permanent basis. It is a corollary of the completion of the disinflation process and 
movement to the stage of stabilizing inflation at the low level. According to the MPC, the 
such defined inflation target should both go in parallel with a dynamic economic growth 
and enable fulfillment of the Maastricht inflation criterion. The CPI is the inflation 
measure best identified by and clearly communicated to the society. Moreover, the 
structure of the Polish CPI index is similar to that of the HICP. Finally, stabilising 
inflation at the low level limits deviations of the annual average from the YoY inflation 
increase. As a result, the measure of inflation target adopted by the MPC should be 
roughly consistent with the way the Maastricht criterion is determined, i.e. by HICP 12-
month moving average.  
One might complain, however, that the MPC have not justified the level of the chosen 
inflation target, not least why it is to be consistent with a rapid economic growth. Taking 
into account the information available at the moment of the strategy’s release (February 
2003), one might come up with the following rationale.  
  85 While defining the inflation target the MPC might assume that the ECB’s monetary policy 
was based on the YoY inflation growth, being in check on a permanent basis and ranging 
between 0-2% (European Central Bank, 1999). On this reasoning, taking 1% inflation 
growth as the ECB’s medium-term target would seem to be fairly logical. Adding to that 
the estimated value of circa 1.5 p.p. (Chmielewski, 2003) for the Balassa-Samuelson effect in 
Poland (see also discussion on the Balassa Samuelson effect in section 3), the 2.5% +/- 1 
p.p. inflation target set by the MPC would seem fully justified. However, the current level 
of inflation in the euro-zone, and, more importantly, the recent revision of the ECB’s 
strategy that it is to aim at stabilizing inflation below but close to 2%, undermine the above-
outlined reasoning and would call for setting the inflation target at the higher level.  
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On the other hand, however, raising the inflation target might imply high costs related to 
the Maastricht criterion fulfillment. In the period of 1998 to May 2003 the reference value 
ranged between 1.8% and 3.4%, while between January 2000 and May 2003 it amounted on 
average to 2.9%
2. Since August 2002 Poland has fulfilled the Maastricht inflation criterion 
                                                 
2 own calculations based on the Eurostat data 
  86 and in May 2003 the HICP 12-month moving average for Poland equaled 0.8%, less than 
for any other EU country (Figure 2). In May 2003, the reference valued amounted to 2.7%, 
and it has not gone below 2.5% since March 2000 (2.4%). The important issue is that since 
EU enlargement the reference group of three countries will be chosen not from current 15, 
but from already 25 EU members. This bears the risk that the value for the inflation 
criterion may plummet. Such a view is supported by the fact that in May 2003, apart from 
Poland (0.8%), the other two countries the reference group would comprise might be
3: 
Lithuania (-0.9%) and the Czech Republic (-0.1%), and, consequently, the inflation 
criterion would reach the low-record value of 1.4%
4. 
Under such circumstances, the need to reduce the inflation from above 2.5% to the 
reference value in the short period of time would require a radical monetary policy 
tightening, which in turn would entail significant social costs. Alternatively, not fulfilling 
Maastricht criterion on schedule would set back euro-zone membership significantly, and 
thus the benefits it would otherwise entail. 
In this context, bearing in mind that the ECB conducts monetary policy for the euro-area 
exclusively, and not the whole EU, it seems that the reference group should comprise euro-
zone members only. It is little justified why a non-euro member, not least with a negative 
price growth, should constitute a ‘model’ reference country
5. 
 
3.  The Balassa-Samuelson effect 
 
The Balassa-Samuelson (BS) effect often constitutes an important part of the framework for 
analysing the accession process. The model, originally formulated by Balassa (1964) and 
Samuelson (1964), explains persistent, of structural nature, deviations of an exchange rate 
from the value implied by the purchasing power parity. According to the model, the 
source of the BS phenomenon stems from higher productivity growth in the home tradable 
                                                 
3 Provided that a member where deflation has taken place is to be numbered among the reference countries. 
Although some statements seem to exclude such a possibility, no formal decision has made it clear so far. 
Nevertheless, even if the reference group did not comprise a country with negative price growth, still it might 
include other EU members with close to but above zero inflation growth. Moreover, a formerly deflation country 
can get back to the positive price growth, thus becoming a new reference country, which might reflect in a 
plummet of the reference value. In this latter case the inflation criterion would become a very volatile figure, 
thus increasing uncertainty as to the eligibility of an AC for euro-zone membership.  
4 own calculations based on the Eurostat data 
5 see footnote 3 
  87 sector in relation to the home non-tradable sector as well as to both sectors of the foreign 
economy. Such a feature constitutes part and parcel of the catching-up process the accession 
countries (ACs) still experience. 
And thus, in the foreseeable future the ACs are expected to follow the real convergence 
progress. This implies that these countries should on average grow faster than the 
incumbent EU members. Moreover, it is widely recognized (and empirical evidence for 
Poland supports this view – see below) that it is the tradable sector that accounts for the 
driving force behind the economic growth. Foreign competition that this sector faces both 
on domestic and foreign markets provides a powerful stimulus to its accelerated 
productivity improvement. It reflects in the ACs’ productivity dynamics outpacing that of 
developed countries, the relationship compounded by the initial low starting point in 
terms of the ACs’ productivity, a legacy of the former command economy. Another factor 
explaining higher productivity growth in the tradable sector in relation to the non-tradable 
sector is concentration of foreign direct investments, which provide know-how and new 
technologies, in the former. By contrast, the non-tradable sector, consisting mostly of 
services, tends to be more regulated (reflected e.g. in prices being set administratively below 
the market level) and thus less attractive for foreign investors than the tradable sector.  
The difference in productivity growth influences the relationship between prices of 
tradable and non-tradable goods on the domestic market. It operates through development 
in wages. In the long run wages in both sectors tend to equalise. This might take place 
because of labour mobility between sectors or due to the strong position of labour unions
6. 
As the tradable sector remains subject to international competition and capital is assumed 
to be internationally perfectly mobile, the rate of wages growth reflects improvements in 
productivity in the tradable sector
7. The productivity growth in the non-tradable sector is 
lower than in the tradable sector, so the equal level of wages in the whole economy implies 
that non-tradable goods in terms of tradable goods have to become more expensive. If there 
                                                 
6 It should be stressed that a high unemployment rate can to a certain extent influence the described effect. In 
particular, two issues should be focused on. First, unemployment does not have to influence the relative rate of 
wages growth in both sectors (unemployment is sometimes wrongly considered as a factor that works against 
sectoral wages equalisation). On the other hand, it can be a source of economy-wide downward pressure on 
wages. It is, however, very difficult to quantify and not so far has not been taken into account in the empirical 
literature of the subject. 
7 This is the condition for equality (in terms of chosen currency) of the price of the tradable goods in the home 
country and abroad and therefore also for the international competitiveness of the home tradable sector. 
  88 are no productivity differentials between these sectors in the foreign economy, then 
straightforward implication of this reasoning will be the real appreciation of the currency 
of the faster growing country. This, in turn, usually reflects in the non-tradable goods 
inflation in the fast growing country. 
The most important issue for the assessment of a possible significance of the Balassa-
Samuelson effect are changes in relative productivities
8. Figure 3 illustrates developments in 
productivity in distinct sectors. Industry represents an approximation of the tradable 
sector, while services account for an approximation of the non-tradable sector
9. 
Productivity is measured as the average product of labour (seasonally adjusted by X-11 
method). Figure 3 provides some evidence that the Balassa-Samuelson effect might be at 
work in Poland. For most of the analysed period, productivity increases in industry were 
higher than in market services. 
Empirical literature dealing with the Balassa-Samuelson effect in the transition countries 
has recently expanded. The so far evidence, however, offers quite varying estimations of 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect, even for the same countries (cf. Halpern and Wyplosz, 2001; 
Égert, 2002a and 2002b; Backé et al., 2002; Sinn and Reutter, 2001). The underlying causes 
are mostly: distinct time periods considered, differences in assumptions and models 
specifications, differences in data-sets construction and even distinct econometric 
techniques applied. Recent empirical results for Poland (Chmielewski, 2003) suggest that 
the probability of the Balassa-Samuelson effect being on average larger or smaller than 1.5 
percentage point is symmetrical. For policy-making purposes it can be estimated that a size 
of the Balassa-Samuelson effect could, on average, fluctuate in the range between 1 and 2 
percentage points. 
Figure 3. Changes in sectoral productivity, year on year, seasonally adjusted, and 
GDP growth   
                                                 
8 A distinct and very important problem for empirical research is how to define the tradable and non-tradable 
sectors, in a way that would be consistent with available data. 
9 This is a common practice in the literature dealing with the Balassa-Samuelson effect. 
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Source: Central Statistical Office and own calculations. 
The crucial point for the coming years is to assess possible developments in sectoral 
productivities. As can be derived from Figure 3 changes in productivity in industry (i.e. the 
tradable sector) is much closely correlated with GDP growth than changes in productivity 
in market services (i.e. the non-tradable sector). Therefore, as economic conditions improve 
(a rise in GDP growth), the difference between the rates of productivity changes in both 
sectors widens. There is not a clear-cut answer to the question whether such a development 
will continue to exist in the future. The difficulty to a large extent stems from the fact that 
accession to the EU will constitute a very significant regime change and therefore the Lucas 
critique
10 may apply. 
First, assume that observed relationship will be still in place. As it is generally reflected in 
the recently published forecasts (e.g. IMF, 2003; European Commission, 2003), outlook for 
the Polish economy is improving. The rate of GDP growth will increase as a result of 
cyclical adjustment (a revival of the economy is expected subsequent to shifting from the 
period of a slowdown to the next stage of the economic cycle) and improving international 
conditions. First benefits of EU accession can also materialise soon. In such a case widening 
of the gap between sectoral productivity changes might be expected. It will lead to 
                                                 
10 Lucas in his famous critique argued that in the case of significant structural change in an economy, economic 
agents (policy makers included) might start to behave dissimilarly to the period before the change. This might 
cause changes in the parameters values of any structural econometric model. Therefore, basing policy makers’ 
reasoning on the estimation results from the period before the structural break, may lead to drawing erroneous 
inference about the period after that break. 
  90 increasing pressure on relative domestic non-tradables inflation and appreciation of the real 
exchange rate. Given the stability of nominal exchange rate, this would imply international 
differentials in inflation rates. This issue is discussed in more details in the latter part of this 
paper where implications of the Maastricht criteria and ERM II membership are developed. 
It should be stressed that the Balassa-Samuelson effect will not cease to exist in a few years 
time. It is a phenomenon of structural nature and will probably remain at work, although 
with diminishing strength, as long as the process of real convergence has not been over. It 
is straightforward then that the BS effect will be of importance to monetary policy-makers 
in Poland until their prerogatives have been fully transferred to the ECB. 
It has been mentioned above that the accession to the EU may make extrapolation of 
relationships observed so far an improper forecasting tool. As far as sectoral productivities 
are concerned, it can take place because of e.g. shift in the pattern of foreign direct 
investment and changes in the competition structure of the Polish market. Expanding 
foreign retail chains in Poland may serve for an example of the former (it also qualitatively 
changes competition environment for many retailers). Offering services without 
establishing strong physical presence in a country, for example offering and selling 
products via internet, might be an unusual challenge for some entities operating already on 
the Polish market. It might be particularly the case for banking and insurance industries 
(one can ask, however, whether these services are still non-tradable), but also, for instance, 
in tourism industry. 
The Balassa-Samuelson effect is one of the possible structural factors that may affect 
inflation and real exchange rate during the early stage of membership in the EU and the 
euro-zone. Their overall impact, however, is very difficult to be assessed ex ante. Therefore, 
the economic and, in particular, monetary policy makers should be aware of the degree of 
uncertainty. In such conditions it is reasonable to pose a question about the possible 
outcome of policy makers’ mistakes or misperception of some developments. 
 
It might happen that policy-makers’ assumptions about the strength of the Balassa-
Samuelson effect and of other structural factors, inherently related to the real convergence 
process, may diverge from their actual impact on inflation. The light is to be cast on how 
  91 such a misjudgement may result in a suboptimal policy framework. Assuming the stability 
of the nominal exchange rate, in the presence of the Balassa-Samuelson effect and effects 
alike, two components of the inflation rate can be distinguished (Schardax, 2001). The first 
can be referred to as a “bad inflation”. “Bad inflation” is by definition unwelcome in the 
economy and diminishing it constitutes a target for the monetary policy authorities. By 
contrast, the second type of inflation, a “good inflation”, is the result of structural 
adjustments in the economy (i.e. the real convergence process). Sectoral productivity 
differentials may serve for an example. The “good” inflation accounts for the influence of 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect and of similar factors on the inflation rate. Attempts to reduce 
the second type of inflation
11 would result in a slowdown in the real convergence because 
of creating too restrictive stance of the economic (and in particular – monetary) policy. It 
should be stressed that it is not only a short-run trade-off between inflation and growth 
that is observed during almost every disinflation process. The inflation rate permanently 
lower, even if it is stable, than the rate of “good inflation” implies costs for the real side of 
the economy in terms of growth being below the potential level. 
Restrictive monetary policy would deteriorate companies’ ability to raise the productivity 
level via less favourable investment conditions. Figure 3 supports for Poland the 
assumption that productivity growth in the non-tradable sector is rather low. Therefore, 
possible deterioration in the productivity growth would take place mostly in the tradable 
sector and, consequently, the difference in the productivity growth between sectors would 
be lower. It would then result in a lower pressure on inflation, but also in a slower growth 
of the economy. The real convergence would therefore be deferred. 
Similarly, misperception of the size of structural, convergence-related factors influencing 
the inflation rate and the real exchange rate may also impinge on ensuing economic 
developments. First, consider a situation when the policy makers assume that the impact of 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect (and other similar effects in terms of their impact on inflation) 
is significant, but, that the actual productivity differential is lower than assumed. Under 
such circumstances, monetary policy might not be restrictive enough. Prospects of the 
higher inflation would not lead to tightening of the monetary policy, for policy makers 
would perceive the inflation increase as a natural corollary of structural adjustments. On 
                                                 
11 Assumption about stability of the nominal exchange remains valid. 
  92 this reasoning, the rise in inflation would not be damaging, because the observed additional 
price growth would predominantly pertain to the “bad inflation” category. 
One might also consider the opposite situation when the estimated size of the Balassa-
Samuelson effect is smaller than the actual one. In such circumstances, the monetary 
authorities would attempt to subdue the “good inflation”. The price growth that would in 
fact stem from the Balassa-Samuelson effect, would then be perceived in terms of the “bad 
inflation”. Therefore, monetary policy would be too restrictive and have adverse effects on 
the rate of the real convergence. The slowdown in the real convergence would thus be the 
ultimate outcome of underestimating the size of the Balassa-Samuelson effect. 
The existence of the Balassa-Samuelson effect in the economy and the commitment to meet 
the nominal convergence criteria should influence the way inflation targets are set. The 
need to comply with the Maastricht criterion implies that the inflation target should not 
exceed an average of three lowest forecasted inflation rates of the EU members by more 
than 1.5 p.p. 
If the projected magnitude of the Balassa-Samuelson effect exceeded allowed inflation 
differential against three best performing countries, the only reasonable inflation target 
would be that consistent with the inflation criterion. In this scenario, either restrictive 
economic policy (e.g. in the form of (additional) monetary or fiscal policy tightening) 
should be conducted temporarily to slow down the productivity growth in the tradable 
sector and diminish the size of the ”good inflation” or the nominal appreciation should be 
allowed (the appreciation resulting from the convergence play may serve for an example). 
Undertaking these measures would stem from the need to fulfil the Maastricht criteria. 
Consequently, pursuing nominal convergence might in this particular case entail the cost 
of a temporal decline in output. Such a growth restraining policy, however, would not 
have to be long-lasting, for it would be necessary only as long as it could influence nominal 
variables in the reference period against which the convergence assessment is made. 
 
4.  Prospects for the exchange-rate policy – from the Zloty to the euro 
  93 According to the Monetary policy strategy beyond 2003, the floating exchange rate system is to be 
maintained until the moment of entering the ERM II. Bringing to light the ins and outs of 
the quasi-fixed exchange rate regime seems to provide credentials for the NBP’s decision.  
First and foremost, under liberalized capital movements volatility of both currency and 
money markets has increased significantly (Garber and Spencer, 1995). Moreover, financial 
innovations have provided market participants with a wide range of instruments that, by 
facilitating leveraged speculation, may exacerbate the risk of exchange rate turbulence 
(Papaioannou, 2002). Vast evidence suggests that of various exchange rate regimes it is soft 
peg arrangements that turn out to be the least immune to the above-outlined potential 
sources of currency crisis, as it was particularly the case in the ERM 1992-93 crisis 
(Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1993; Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz, 1995; McKinnon, 1997).  
The foregoing should be of special interest to the ACs, for during the period preceding 
their euro-zone membership they are likely to face massive capital movements, which may 
stem from various factors. And thus, catching up economies, with relatively low domestic 
savings, usually offer prospects of higher returns on investment, which should encourage 
capital inflows. Moreover, to the extent that EU membership holds out the prospect of 
joining the euro-zone, enhanced credibility and reinforced expectations of interest rates 
convergence and exchange rate stability may boost consumers’ spending and attract further 
capital influx. Furthermore, an improved access to global financial markets would add to 
that process. In addition, incomplete privatization would lure still more foreign investment 
in a limited time span (Koronowski and Rozkrut, 2003). Last but not least, the necessity to 
maintain relatively high interest rates, implied by levels of natural interest rates in the ACs 
(Brzoza-Brzezina, 2003), and the need to stabilize inflation expectations at a low level, 
would encourage further capital inflows.  
While fleshing out the issue of capital movements in the ACs, one should touch upon a 
phenomenon dubbed “convergence play”. It accounts for foreign portfolio capital inflow 
ensuing from expectations of nominal interest rates reduction. The convergence play is 
usually considered as a potentially important factor that should be taken into account in 
the policy formulation process in the ACs. It provides investors with a capital profit on 
  94 changes of the bills and bonds prices
12. As long as there are possibilities of realising 
significant gains without a meaningful risk, one can expect that foreign capital will 
continue to inflow into the Polish financial markets, exerting the appreciation pressure on 
the nominal exchange rate. The question that arises is whether such opportunities will still 
exist after joining the EU and, subsequently, the euro-zone. 
As of today, it seems that in Poland there is not much room left for further reductions in 
nominal interest rates, with the NBP’s reference rate being now slightly above 5%. It 
reflects the completion of the disinflation process (see section 1). Moreover, estimates of 
the natural interest rate for Poland at the level of 4-6% (Brzoza-Brzezina, 2003) should also 
temper expectations of further interest rates reductions. The conclusion to be drawn is that 





































































































































































WIBOR1M Treasury bonds 10Y
 
                                                 
12 Other possibility of realising such a gain is to use syntetic instruments replicating government bonds pay-off 
profile, such as FX swaps. 
  95 Source: NBP 
There is, however, a possibility that a new type of convergence play will come to the 
forefront in Poland before euro-zone membership takes effect. It could be referred to as a 
“yield curve convergence play”. In Poland, the yield curve has still inverted shape. It is the 
combined result of relatively high short term interest rates and lower long term rates, the 
latter determined mostly by expectations of a successful catching-up process and short term 
interest rates prospective reductions as euro-zone membership approaches. When the yield 
curve is about to switch from inverted to the normal shape, taking opposite position in 
long- and short-term papers would generate arbitrage-like profits. 
The above-outlined scenario of capital inflows to the ACs should lead to their currencies 
appreciation. Real exchange rate appreciation can take place either through nominal 
exchange rate appreciation, when inflation rates in the home country and abroad are 
similar, or through international inflation differentials, with the stable nominal exchange 
rate. In what way it will take place will largely depend on the economic policy pursued. 
Were nominal appreciation preferable to inflation growth, then under a quasi-fixed 
exchange rate regime it might result in approaching the ceiling of the pre-determined 
fluctuation bands. In such circumstances the scope for monetary policy tightening would 
be limited, for interest rates rise would attract still more capital inflows, thus exacerbating 
currency appreciation pressures. Therefore, if faced with the need to subdue inflation, 
resorting to the parity revaluation might turn out the only viable solution, a view often 
supported by lower efficiency of the interest rate channel relative to the exchange rate with 
respect to their influence on the inflation
13.  
By and large, the above-outlined sequence of events might lead to a domestic currency 
appreciation, most likely in parallel with current account deterioration, a state that would 
not have to be consistent with economic fundamentals. If the positive market sentiment, 
boosted by the overall optimism, persisted, it might lead to a prolonged overvaluation and 
excessive fluctuations of the exchange rate (Papaioannou, 2002).  
Moreover, in the quasi-fixed exchange rate system, such as the ERM II, tacitly implied 
exchange rate guarantee, set by the width of the fluctuation bands around the parity level, 
                                                 
13 For more on that see: Koronowski and Rozkrut (2003); for interest rate tool insufficiency: Bank of Greece 
(2001) or Garganas and Tavlas (2001); for exchange rate vs interest rate transmission mechanism: Łyziak 
(2001), Przystupa (2002). 
  96 constitutes a source of a moral hazard problem (Burnside et al., 1999). This, in turn, may 
incline market participants to underestimate the growing balance of payments problem and 
lead to the negligence of hedging against exchange rate risk.  
Consequently, in the event of the investors’ sentiment turnaround and subsequent financial 
markets turbulence, a significant depreciation pressure could be exerted on the national 
currency, which might eventually make the parity devaluation inevitable
14. In the presence 
of the above-stated recklessness of the market participants, such an abrupt currency 
plummet might lead to exacerbating economic costs due to unmatched foreign exchange 
composition of their assets and liabilities. Under a floating exchange rate regime, lack of 
any exchange rate guarantee forces market participants to hedge against currency 
turbulence, which also increases the cost of potential speculations.  
Another issue to be stressed here is that the ACs are not entirely immune to the risk of 
contagion effect, for they are still pigeonholed as the “basket countries”. Therefore, any 
financial disturbances in one AC may be perceived as foreshadowing similar events in other 
candidate countries. As a result, investors may withdraw their funds, thus exerting 
depreciation pressure on the ACs’ currencies. In the era of liberalized capital movements, 
massive outflows of capital may not be withstood, thus entailing necessary parity 
realignment (CEPR, 2003). In addition, the potential impact of contagion may largely be 
reinforced by the shallowness of the ACs’ financial markets. Therefore, even reasonably 
strong macroeconomic fundamentals and prudential supervisory arrangements may not 
rule out the above-outlined sequence of events, leading to the breakdown of the quasi-fixed 
exchange rate arrangement. 
It should also be emphasized that any attempts to maintain the exchange rate at the level 
considered by the market as being in variance with fundamentals often turn out futile and 
lead to currency crisis (Papaioannou, 2002). In particular, it was the case in the Czech 
Republic where persistent high inflation and simultaneous rigidity of the exchange rate, 
whose fluctuations were limited to the predetermined bands, led to overvaluation of the 
Czech Koruna. In the aftermath of the speculation attack, the Czech currency was floated 
in May 1997.  
                                                 
14 For factors that may contribute to the U-turn of the investors’ sentiment and foreign capital hasty retreat see: 
A. Koronowski and M. Rozkrut, Towards the euro-zone through the ERM II. Countering fallacies, mimeo, 2003 
  97 Realignment of the central parity might offset the above-outlined harmful scenario. This, 
however, would weaken the parity credibility as a “nominal anchor”, for such a decision 
might trigger further speculations based on the “history repeats itself” belief. In addition, 
empirical evidence indicates that changing parity both at the right time and in proper 
dimension is hardly an easy task (CEPR, 2003).   
Focusing more closely on the particular quasi-fixed exchange rate regime, the ERM II, this 
framework is said to provide its members with a seemingly wide scope for exchange rate 
movements within +/- 15% bands. Such flexibility, therefore, should mitigate the above-
outlined risks that the quasi-fixed exchange rate regimes are exposed to. In fact, this is a 
mistaken picture, for the maintenance of one’s currency within wide fluctuation bands 
does not guarantee fulfillment of the exchange rate stability criterion. Such a conclusion 
can be drawn from the convergence reports expounding the position of the EC (European 
Commission, 2002b) and, to a lesser extent and in a more ambiguous way, of the ECB 
(European Central Bank, 2002) on the exchange rate stability assessment
15. The stance 
adopted by the European authorities seems to imply that breaching the 2.25% depreciation 
band constitutes a “severe tensions” yardstick, thus entailing failure in the exchange rate 
stability test. Therefore, taking advantage of the above-extolled flexibility of the ERM II 
framework may stay in contradiction with the eligibility for euro-zone membership 
(Koronowski and Rozkrut, 2003). By contrast, judging by the experience of Ireland or 
Greece, appreciation of one’s currency, no matter whether far from or close to the upper 
band, would not run counter to the Maastricht criterion fulfillment (Rozkrut, 2003a). Such 
an asymmetric nature of the ERM II is even more pronounced when taking into account 
the permissible upward realignment of the parity, whereas resorting to the central rate 
devaluation is forbidden (“Agreement of … “, 1998). 
The advocates of the ERM II stress that flexibility of this framework, though questionable 
– as argued above, will greatly facilitate the task of “finding” the equilibrium exchange rate. 
The available evidence, however, seems to undermine the foregoing view, for the 
experience teaches that, no matter the width of fluctuation bands, massive flows of capital 
and subsequent exchange rate shifts not strictly related to fundamentals may be possible 
(Koronowski and Rozkrut, 2003). In particular, the experience of Greece has shown that rather than a 
                                                 
15 For more on the asymmetric nature of the ERM II arrangement see: Borowski et al. (2003) 
  98 useful test the ERM 2 gives rise to a convergence play in which short term capital flows are affected by expectations 
on the final parity chosen (Coricelli, 2001).  
Another argument quoted by the advocates of the ERM II is that the credibility of this 
framework is greatly enhanced by the ECB’s support. In fact, the only extra facility the 
members of the ERM II are provided with is the ECB’s aid in the foreign exchange 
conduct. Yet even this measure is subject to numerous constraints and ambiguities
16. And 
thus, daily ceilings are imposed on the unilateral use of the ACs’ own resources in the 
foreign exchange intervention conduct. These limits may formally be exceeded only after 
the prior assent of the ECB. Moreover, drawing on very short term facilities (VSTF) 
within margins is limited to the extent that any recourse to that source of financing is of 
little, if any, help. For Bank of Greece and Danmarks Nationalbank these limits were set at 
the level of EUR 300mln and EUR 520mln respectively. For Poland they have been 
estimated at circa EUR 450mln (Bofinger and Wollmershauser, 2002). It is enough to set 
the latter number against the NBP’s EUR 28bln foreign reserves to get a picture of the 
usefulness of the ECB’s support within margins of the ERM II framework.  



























































































































                                                 
16 The issue on foreing exchange interventions within the ERM II is developed in: A. Koronowski and M. 
Rozkrut (2003) 
  99 Source: NBP, own calculations 
As for the interventions at the margins, the ECB’s unlimited and automatic financing 
might seem to largely contribute to the credibility of the ERM II. One might argue, 
however, that the foregoing view is somewhat exaggerated, when set against the following 
rationale. Firstly, foreign exchange interventions may offset only short-term pressures 
exerted on the domestic currency. In this respect, the NBP’s foreign reserves seem to be far 
in excess of their reasonable use for this purpose. Secondly, when faced with exchange rate 
misalignments, i.e. when fundamental factors underlie the inappropriateness of the parity 
level, the attempts to defend the currency through foreign exchange interventions may 
become nothing but useless and costly waste of resources. Under such circumstances the 
ECB could not help much either (Koronowski and Rozkrut, 2003). In addition, drawing 
on VSTF, be it at or within the margins, is limited by maturity constraints. Last but not 
least, foreign exchange intervention rules are so vague that number of issues still needs to 
be cleared up
17.  
While juxtaposing the quasi fixed against floating exchange rate regime, it should be 
emphasized that the former is fully consistent with the DIT strategy, which is at the core 
of the NPB’s policy. By contrast, an eclectic policy based on both the exchange rate and 
inflation targets pursued simultaneously at some point may lead to inconsistencies, which 
have recently been observed in Hungary. Consequently, the just-outlined trade-off may be 
harmful to the credibility, and thus stability, of the system and give rise to financial 
markets turmoil (Rozkrut, 2003a).  
Figure 6. PLN/EUR exchange rate movements 
                                                 
17 see footnote 16 
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Source: NBP, for the figure’s description – see text. 
Finally, flexibility of the floating exchange rate regime is by definition higher than that of 
the quasi-fixed exchange rate system and, therefore, provides more scope for the market 
forces to “look for” an equilibrium exchange rate. In this case, however, significant 
volatility of the zloty, not least since it was floated (Figure 5), calls for an extreme caution 
when establishing the parity. In terms of fulfilling the Maastricht criterion, zloty 
movements against the euro should be an issue of particular concern. Figure 6 depicts the 
Polish currency movements against the euro, and more precisely – around the parity 
established, for instance, at the level of 3,9937 PLN per euro (as of the moment of the zloty 
being fully floated in April 2000). Two hypothetical fluctuation bands of various widths, 
+/-15% (red lines) and +/-2.25% (green lines), are presented.  
According to what Figure 6 illustrates, and on the assumption that –2.25% “severe 
tensions” benchmark holds, three distinct periods (red colored) when the Polish currency 
breached the narrow depreciation band can be distinguished. Whether these infringements 
would entail the negative assessment of the exchange rate stability seems to be a matter of 
judgement on the European authorities’ side. As of today, however, it is anybody’s guess 
what the criteria for the exchange rate stability appraisal really are (Koronowski and 
Rozkrut, 2003).  
 
  101 5.  Proper central parity – a prerequisite for successful ERM II membership 
 
Therefore, maintenance of the exchange rate within the “right”, may it be -2.25% / +15%, 
fluctuation bands may constitute a real challenge. To a large extent, it will hinge on the 
appropriateness of the level of the parity chosen. And thus, the asymmetric nature of the 
ERM II implies a bias for a depreciated central rate (Coricelli, 2001). Provided that market 
rate would follow an undervalued parity, initial boost to export competitiveness would be 
short term only, for a weaker domestic currency would give rise to the subsequent increase 
in inflation. If monetary authorities were credible enough, i.e. their commitment to 
maintain the parity were unquestionable, adaptive inflationary expectations might be 
reinforced to a larger extent within the ERM II than would otherwise be the case under the 
floating regime. The more these expectations were manifested in the wage pressure, and 
subsequently – in the price growth, the larger real appreciation of the domestic currency 
would be, and the sooner the initial improvement of the economy’s competitiveness would 
be subdued. In these circumstances the monetary tightening, reflected in the interest rates 
increase, would be required to contain inflationary pressures. The necessity to fulfil 
another Maastricht criterion would imply raising the volume of costly sterilized 
interventions in order to stifle appreciation pressures stemming from the interest rates 
increase. As a result, tightening of the monetary policy, combined with lower NBP’s 
profits, and thus the government’s income, would constrain economic growth and put 
under threat another Maastricht requirement - fulfillment of the budget deficit criterion.  
Similarly, establishment of the parity at too high a level is not free of dangers either. Strong 
domestic currency would impinge on the competitiveness of exporters and – consequently 
– might lead to current account deterioration, which is one of the chief factors taken into 
account in the economy’s stability assessment. At some point, conviction of the zloty’s 
overvaluation might give rise to the market turnaround and thus, depreciation pressures. 
However, sharp plummet of the zloty, let alone devaluation of the parity, would run 
counter to the Maastricht criterion on the exchange rate stability (Borowski and Woreta, 
2002).  
Therefore, setting the parity at a level inconsistent with economic fundamentals, be it 
overvaluation or undervaluation of the exchange rate, might restrain economic growth and 
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entry into the euro-zone, with all the benefits it would otherwise entail.  
As the zloty may be expected to appreciate in real terms during Poland’s stay in the ERM 
II, it may complicate the process of designing the optimal policy on the accession path. The 
source of this difficulty stems from a potential inconsistency between nominal and real 
variables. The central parity within the ERM II and – subsequently - an exchange rate of 
entry to the euro-zone are set and assumed to be constant in nominal terms. This implies, 
however, that in case of the catching up economies, they will most likely appreciate in real 
terms. As it has already been argued, real appreciation of the exchange rate accounts for the 
real convergence process and if the magnitude of both is closely related, the international 
competitiveness of the Polish economy will not be hampered. A difficulty may stem from 
the fact that the just-outlined relationship between the real appreciation and real 
convergence progress may not hold in the short-term. And thus, persistent nominal 
rigidities in the economy (e.g. already mentioned incomplete pass-through of nominal 
exchange rate changes into domestic prices) may lead to real appreciation not being in line 
with the pace of real convergence. It takes time for all adjustment processes in the economy 
(e.g. monetary transmission mechanism) to operate fully. Therefore, it stresses the need of 
proper policy actions well before the beginning of the reference period.  
As it has been mentioned in the discussion on the potential impact of the Balassa-
Samuelson effect, in case of very rapid economic growth, especially during the reference 
period, it might be necessary to resort to the nominal exchange rate tool to adjust domestic 
tradable goods prices in order to meet the inflation criterion. Therefore, it implies the need 
that projected developments (trend) in the nominal exchange rate, not least in the first year 
of participation in the ERM II, should be taken into account when establishing the level of 
the central parity. The underlying rationale is that for some time the nominal exchange 
rate may deviate from the path consistent with the equilibrium real exchange rate. 
It may be assumed that the central parity will be perceived by market participants as a 
reference point for the ultimate conversion rate. This belief will be based on the monetary 
authorities’ commitment to maintain the parity. Moreover, the nearer euro-zone entry, the 
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18. This, combined with expectations about the 
inflation rate, should make possible calculation of the expected real exchange rate of entry. 
However, any deviations of the actual inflation from the projected path would change the 
value of the parity in real terms. If the source of such a shock to the inflation differential 
stemmed from the relative productivity growth (i.e. reflecting the pace of the real 
convergence), the deviation of the real exchange rate from the expected path would be fully 
justified and with no harm to the competitiveness of the economy
19. However, the 
unexpected real exchange rate change may also result from the shocks of nominal nature. 
These can be related to some nominal rigidities in the home economy and asymmetric 
reactions to large swings on international markets. Such developments may call for the 
realignment of the expected entry rate to the euro-zone. 
Lack of knowledge about the exact value of the equilibrium real exchange rate constitutes a 
real challenge for the policy makers, not least in light of the above-outlined consequences 
of setting the parity at the level inconsistent with fundamentals. Coming up with precise 
point estimates of the equilibrium real exchange rate, however, is hardly feasible, even for 
most developed economies (MacDonald and Stein, 1999). This uncertainty should be taken 
into account in the policy formulation before and during the period of participation in the 
ERM II.  
One may conclude from the foregoing that there is prevailing uncertainty with respect to 
the future strength of factors that may influence the real exchange rate development. 
Moreover, various shocks of different nature, which can influence the level of the long 
term equilibrium real exchange rate, may take place. It would therefore seem to be 
preferable to establish the central parity within the ERM II at the level that would leave 
some scope for potential realignments. This, combined with an asymmetric nature of the 
ERM II framework (see section 4), seems to strengthen the bias for undervaluation of the 
parity. Such a downward inclination seems to be reinforced by the fact that, once in the 
monetary union, it is easier to correct the real exchange rate misalignments when the entry 
                                                 
18 If the market participants expect a different entry rate, then nominal exchange rate will deviate in a systematic 
way from the parity.  
19 Provided that inflation deviation would exactly reflect changes in the relative productivity growth 
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needed)
20. 
Above-outlined hypothetical approach of the policy makers towards the central parity 
establishment might affect the behaviour of the foreign exchange market participants. 
According to the advocates of the ERM II, one of its virtues is anchoring expectations of 
the nominal exchange rate to the central parity. It is generally true, given the proper level 
of the central parity, in case of an exchange rate between economies growing on average at 
the same pace. The Maastricht criteria framework, however, gives rise to the risk of biased 
expectations as to the expected parity movements. The underlying rationale is as follows. 
The authorities’ potential incentive to set the central parity somewhat below the level the 
fundamentals would call for would not escape the market participants’ attention. In this 
respect, credibility of any announcements regarding the commitment of the policy makers 
not to revalue the parity might be undermined. It is an illustrative example of the time-
inconsistency problem.  
Policy makers would try to convince the market participants that they have set the parity 
according to their best assessment of the equilibrium real exchange rate and, therefore, 
would not change the central rate. However, the policy makers, not least in the ACs, like 
Poland, with unstable relationships in the economy and short available time series for 
econometric analyses, cannot be very certain ex ante that their assessment of the real 
exchange rate is appropriate. In the course of time new information may come to light, 
allowing better assessment of the equilibrium exchange rate – in either direction – 
appreciation or depreciation. In such a situation the authorities might decide to realign the 
central parity (mirroring their expectations of the proper exchange rate of entry to the 
euro-zone). For policy makers, the expected shift of the central parity in the indefinite 
future, in terms of expected value, is equal to zero. If it were not for the asymmetry of the 
Maastricht exchange rate criterion, the above sequence of events should indeed reveal 
policy makers’ true assessment of the equilibrium exchange rate. However, given their 
commitment to meet the Maastricht criteria, they should maintain some room for 
                                                 
20 The correction of the overvalued real exchange rate within a monetary union implies that, for a given 
monetary union’s subarea, lower inflation than in the rest of the union is necessary. If the rest of the union 
experiences low inflation rates then even deflation might be necessary to correct the misalignment. 
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level on the downward side. 
The above-outlined reasoning might give rise to speculations based on the conviction that 
the central parity will be revalued, which would add to the appreciation pressures. Unless 
the central bank intervened, it might lead to a serious overvaluation of the currency
21. And 
the more discord among the policy makers, the more probable such a scenario would be. 
This is particularly the case in Poland where exchange rate policy has been a bone of 
contention between the National Bank of Poland and Ministry of Finance. And thus, 
recent events have shown that divergence of opinions about the optimal level of the 
exchange rate might be significant.  
The foregoing stresses the necessity for a very high level of transparency in policy 
formulation, especially as far as setting the central parity in the ERM II is concerned. It 
seems to be the only way to assure the markets that policy makers are going to reveal their 
true expectations. Otherwise, speculation pressures may arise, attracting even more short-
term portfolio capital influx and, therefore, lead to the foreign exchange market turmoil.  
The already emphasized potential divergence of opinions among the policy makers gives 
rise to another concern, closely related to the potential misjudgement in assessing the 
proper level of the exchange rate. Suppose that policy makers are not that much politically 
committed to enter the euro-zone “as soon as possible”. Assume also that there is a 
significant overvaluation of the real exchange rate that is damaging to the competitiveness 
of the tradable sector
22. Under such circumstances, policy makers might consider the costs 
for the real economy, stemming from the overvalued exchange rate, as higher than the 
costs of postponing euro-zone membership, subsequent to sharp depreciation or 
devaluation of the parity. In such a situation, they might withdraw from their vow to meet 
the nominal convergence criteria. As it would alter expectations about the future path of 
interest rates changes, a hasty retreat of the capital, previously attracted by the perspectives 
of gains from the convergence play, might ensue. The ultimate outcome would be abrupt 
depreciation of the exchange rate, with all the consequences the currency turmoil entails. 
                                                 
21 A speculative attack against a currency on which appreciation pressure is exerted is not just a theoretical 
concept as illustrated by the Hungarian forint turmoil in January 2003. 
22 The overvaluation might in this case be considered as a result of an earlier mistake in assessing the level of the 
equilibrium real exchange rate. 
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level and make the markets believe that it is indeed the right one. These tasks, although 
prerequisites, still do not guarantee successful membership within the ERM II. Apart from 
the above-outlined risks inherently associated with the adoption of the quasi-fixed exchange 
rate regime, there is another factor that one should focus on more closely. It is fiscal 
discipline that constitutes “the must” before a decision on the ERM II entry is taken. Fiscal 
imbalance will imply the necessity to contain additional inflationary pressure so that the 
Maastricht price stability criterion is fulfilled. Current research on the transmission 
mechanisms suggests that it is through exchange rate channel rather than central bank’s 
interest rate shifts that inflation may be influenced more efficiently in the short span.  
Resorting to nominal exchange rate as an adjustment tool, however, is of limited use. The 
reason for this is incomplete and delayed pass-through from changes in the nominal 
exchange rate to changes in domestic prices. In case of Poland the pass-through from 
nominal exchange rate to domestic prices of the tradable goods in one-year time is equal to 
0.5 (Przystupa, 2002) – i.e. one percentage change in nominal exchange rate after a year will 
result in a half percentage change of the PPI (the producer price index that consists mostly 
of tradable goods)
23. Therefore, subduing inflation through exchange rate channel would 
require additional nominal appreciation, thus resulting in excessive real appreciation. This, 
in turn, would hamper economy’s competitiveness. Moreover, fluctuation bands, even if 
relatively wide, might not contain the required dimension of nominal appreciation. On 
this reasoning, shortage of alternative efficient disinflation measures implies the necessity of 
fiscal policy tightening within the ERM II framework. 
On the above-outlined reasoning, it comes to light that potential risks associated with ERM 
II membership by far outweigh those few and still questionable advantages that this 
mechanism entails. Consequently, the ERM II should be perceived as a “waiting room” 
rather than a “useful framework”. Therefore, Poland’s membership within this framework 
should be shortened to the minimum required period of time. The moment of entry, 
however, should largely hinge on the viability of the disciplined fiscal policy conduct and 
certainty that other Maastricht criteria will be fulfilled in time. Until these prerequisites 
                                                 
23 The impact of change in nominal exchange rate on the CPI, consisting of both tradable and non-tradable goods 
is even smaller. It is the CPI that should be of interest to the ACs because the Maastricht criteria are set in terms 
of the HICP, which is roughly consistent with the CPI index (see section 2). 
  107 have not been fulfilled, it is the floating exchange rate system that seems to fit the best the 
realm of the Polish economy. Against this background, the MPC’s decision to maintain the 
current regime is the second best to none.  
 
6.  Maastricht challenges – real vs nominal convergence 
 
Eligibility for euro-zone membership will hinge, inter alia, on the fulfillment of the 
Maastricht criteria. With public debt largely secure and long term interest rates criterion 
already fulfilled (Figure 7) and being closely related to the inflation performance and 
credibility of the macroeconomic policy, it is other criteria that should be focused on more 
closely. Of these, the exchange rate stability assessment has already been developed. And 
thus, the most concerning issue seems to be that pertaining to the general government 
deficit, for swinging commitments and worse and worse updates of fiscal projections give 
rise to a quite gloomy perspective in Poland. In addition, without fiscal discipline the 
necessity to contain inflationary pressures within the ERM II will imply resorting to 
measures that may be inconsistent with other Maastricht criteria, as outlined above (see 
section 5). As for the inflation criterion, though now well below the reference value 
(Figure 2), various factors, such as economic revival, supply shocks, or still growing fiscal 
expenditures may lead to the price growth rebound. And the bigger downward 
realignment of the reference value subsequent to EU enlargement is, the more challenging 
the inflation criterion will be (see section 2).  
The above-outlined analysis points out that in the short run there might be a trade-off 
between the real and nominal convergence. If paths of some nominal variables (i.e. the 
inflation rate, the nominal exchange rate) are subject to exogenous restrictions (e.g. the 
nominal convergence criteria) that do not take into account changes in the structure of the 
economy, situation in the real sector of the economy can deteriorate. In other words, the 
optimal path of the real convergence process may imply such developments in some 
nominal quantities that run counter to the nominal convergence criteria. A critical 
question is, therefore, whether imposed nominal convergence criteria provide enough 
room for adjustment for catching-up economies. This issue is discussed in what follows. 
  108 While inflation should be stabilised at a low level, at the same time it should be prevented 
from going below some optimal level. In case of a catching-up country this optimal level is 
equal to the rate that wards off the threat of deflation increased by the “good inflation” 
components. Assume that the average inflation rate of “three best performers” among the 
EU members accounts for an approximation of that “deflation immune” ingredient
24. For 
the accommodation of the nominal effects of the real convergence there would remain 1.5 
percentage point allowed by the Maastricht Treaty plus the extent to which the inflation 
might be contained by nominal exchange rate appreciation (see section 3).  
As outlined above, so far observed relationships in Poland allow estimating the impact of 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect on average in the range of 1-2 percentage points. If relationship 
between sectoral productivity differentials and GDP growth continues, it could be 
advisable that the reference years fall in a period of economic slowdown, because the then-
impact of the Balassa-Samuelson effect would be of limited magnitude. Nevertheless, 
according to the provided estimates, even a sharp boost to economic growth would not 
pose a significant trade-off between real and nominal convergence, for potential additional 
contribution of the BS effect would still be small enough, and thus relatively easily offset 
via nominal exchange rate appreciation of reasonable size. 
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  109 Source: Eurostat database, own calculations 
In addition to numerous challenges to be faced before joining the monetary union, still 
more spokes are put in the ACs’ wheel on their road to the euro-zone
25. And thus, 
allegations are addressed to, inter alia,  still underdeveloped and insufficiently integrated 
financial markets (Kroger, 2002). Since October 2002, however, Poland has fully liberalized 
capital flows and there remain no formal stumbling blocks to the unconstrained both 
domestic and cross-border flows of capital. Moreover, transactions turnover on the forex 
market in Poland exceeds several times that of Greece or Ireland in the period preceding 
their accession to the euro-zone. Finally, well developed inter-bank derivative markets (e.g. 
FX Swap, FRA, and IRS) in Poland are in fact an integral part of the international financial 
market (Koronowski and Rozkrut, 2003). Yet, as nitpickers may persist, the argument 
about the financial market shallowness cannot be entirely parried. Having admitted that, 
however, should not serve for an argument against fast enlargement of the euro zone. It is 
due to the fact that although EU membership will precipitate the process of financial 
integration with the EU internal market (though itself still not completely integrated), the 
introduction of the euro should provide most powerful impetus for the desired 
development in this area (Galati and Tsatsaronis, 2001). 
Another allegation concerns seemingly high share of bad loans in the ACs’ banking sector 
(Kroger, 2002; European Commission, 2002c). Despite the high level of the NPL ratio in 
Poland, it should be borne in mind that it is largely due to implementing a much stricter 
definition for classifying a particular loan as a non-performing one. And thus, in Poland 
the NPLs are fully covered by reserves. Accordingly, they do not cause an erosion of the 
banks’ capital base (Koronowski and Rozkrut, 2003), which is reflected in the capital 
adequacy ratio for the Polish banking sector (15%; NBP, 2002) exceeding the EU average 
(12.04%; European Central Bank, 2003). 
Others reproach the ACs for their run to the euro-zone pointing out their insufficient 
structural convergence, related to meeting the preconditions determined by the OCA 
theory: real and financial openness, mobility of factors of production, high share of 
common trade, etc. (Gaspar, 2001). Therefore, the opponents of fast enlargement take a 
                                                 
25 The following constitutes a rough overview of the arguments presented in A. Koronowski and M. Rozkrut 
(2003). 
  110 position that the OCA criteria should be taken into account while assessing the ACs’ 
suitability for euro-zone membership (European Commission, 2002c).   
The foregoing, however, seems to overlook the fact that a number of the ACs appear to have 
reached a high degree of cyclical co-variation with the euro-area, which exceeds in some cases that of the less 
integrated current members of the euro-area (European Commission, 2002c). And thus, comparative 
analysis shows a relatively high and moderate cyclical convergence in industrial production 
and GDP respectively between Poland and the euro area (Borowski and Woreta, 2002). 
Against this background, Poland’s susceptibility to asymmetric shocks should be limited. 
On the other hand, the intensity of intra-industry trade between Poland and the euro-zone, 
which reflects the sustainability of cyclical convergence, is relatively low (Bratkowski and 
Rostowski, 2001; Borowski, 2001). Such a weak performance stems from the structural 
nature of Poland’s trade deficit with the euro-area. Nevertheless, the share of intra-industry 
trade in the overall Polish trade with the euro zone has been increasing continuously and 
the observed trend is predicted to persist in the forthcoming future. Strengthening cyclical 
convergence, and thus reducing susceptibility to asymmetric shocks, will largely hinge on 
the FDI inflows, which should be encouraged by a proper macroeconomic policy 
(Borowski, 2001).  
Furthermore, when measured by the share of the exports of goods to the EU countries in 
the overall export volume, Poland’s convergence with the EU (69.2%) exceeds that of the 
most of the incumbent EU members, let alone the EU average (61.9%) (Eurostat/Comext 
2002). 
Moreover, in many EU countries labor markets are more rigid than they are in Poland. 
Such a view is supported, inter alia, by setting the EPL ratio for Poland (2.0) against those, 
e.g. for Germany, France, Italy, or Portugal, which amount to 2.6, 2.8, 3.4, and 3.7 
respectively (Knogler, 2002). Notwithstanding that, low propensity to migration, as 
measured by intensity of intrinsic migration in Poland (Borowski, 2000), would call for 
another adjustment mechanism in order to contain the potential effects of asymmetric 
shocks. As yet low real wage flexibility, however, cannot compensate sufficiently for the 
lack of labor mobility in Poland (Borowski, 2002). Therefore, removal of persistent labor 
rigidities should be numbered among the priorities of the macroeconomic policy in the 
nearest future.  
  111 Furthermore, as the ACs are predominantly perceived as small and open economies, it 
might be stated that foregoing an independent monetary policy should not constitute too 
big a sacrifice for them (De Grauwe, 1997; Mundell, 2000). Last but not least, the above-
outlined allegations downplay the hypothesis about endogenous nature of the OCA 
criteria, according to which membership within a monetary union endogenously 
accelerates the process of generating the conditions, which are determinants for a successful 
participation in the common currency area (see; Rose, 2000; Frankel and Rose, 1998; 
Fidrmuc, 2001; Maurel, 2002).  
The opponents of fast euro-zone enlargement reach out for still more arguments to 
postpone the ACs’ entry into the monetary union
26. Lots of them, however, lack 
substance. And thus for an illustrative example may serve the attempts to prevent the 
candidate countries from joining the euro-zone on the basis of their insufficient real 
convergence, understood as a persisting income gap between the ACs and the EU average 
(Kroger, 2002). Such an approach is groundless, for on both the theoretical and empirical 
ground the real income level cannot serve for an argument against entering the monetary 
union.  
 
7.  Convergence progress within the Eurozone 
 
As the real convergence will be a long-lasting phenomenon, the Ballassa-Samuelson effect, 
though of uncertain strength, will remain at work also during the early stage of Poland’s 
membership in the euro-zone. Its influence, however, might by then have differed from 
what can be observed now, mostly because of two factors: firstly, the impossibility of any 
adjustment via the nominal exchange rate and, secondly, Poland being fully subject to the 
common monetary policy of the ECB in the aftermath of foregoing monetary policy 
independence.  
Changes in the real exchange rate after joining the monetary union will reflect changes in 
the relative prices between Poland and the rest of the Euroland. Once in the monetary 
union, the inflation rate would not be subject to restrictions imposed by any type of a 
nominal convergence criterion. Provided that shifts in the real exchange rate would fully 
                                                 
26 For more on that see: Koronowski and Rozkrut (2003) 
  112 mirror developments in the relative sectoral productivity and that Poland entered the euro-
zone with the exchange rate at the equilibrium level, this would imply that, at least on the 
theoretical grounds, the real exchange rate would remain on the equilibrium path. 
The ACs’ GDP, let alone Poland’s, accounts for only a small fraction of that of the euro-
area. Therefore, the ECB’s interest rates will be set predominantly on the basis of inflation 
developments in large economies of the euro-zone. At the beginning of membership in the 
euro-area, due to existence of higher inflation stemming from the Balassa-Samuelson effect, 
the real interest rates in Poland would be lower than in most of the Euroland. As long as 
various asymmetries between incumbent and new members of the euro-zone persist, the 
common monetary policy might remain too loose for the fast growing catching-up 
economies. 
The other argument supporting such a view is related to the issue of the already mentioned 
natural interest rates. As long as the natural interest rate for Poland exceeds that for the rest 
of the euro area, the neutral policy stance of the ECB will turn out to be expansionary for 
Poland. The question that arises is for how long such differences will persist
27.  
Lower nominal and real interest rates, as a corollary of joining the euro-zone, might trigger 
the rise of the domestic demand that may potentially pose a threat to the stability of the 
economy. Demand for credit from enterprises and households would probably rise 
significantly. This would reflect the increase in investment, encouraged by low real interest 
rates, and a consumption boom financed by banking credit. Simultaneously, low real 
interest rates will decrease propensity to save.  
Basing on the experience of Portugal in the years 1990-2000, one may foreshadow that the 
Polish banks will probably be forced to seek financial resources abroad. It would imply an 
abrupt shift in the banking sector environment. So far the Polish banking sector has 
experienced liquidity surplus. The bank financing of the economy is less than it could be, 
and excessive liquidity has to be absorbed by the NBP. It generates additional costs for the 
central bank and makes monetary policy conduct more difficult. If consumption rises and 
propensity to save decreases, the excessive liquidity of the banking sector will spread out as 
                                                 
27 It is closely related to the issue of optimality of a currency area. The more the enlarged euro area resembles the 
model optimal currency area, the smaller divergences in the impact of the common monetary policy on specific 
regions of the euro-zone will be. The hypothesis about the endogenous nature can precipitate that process (see 
section 6). 
  113 there will be higher demand for credit and lower supply of deposits. Such a development 
might take place already before joining the euro-zone. In these circumstances, effectiveness 
of the Polish monetary policy might increase because banks will be more sensitive to the 
shifts in short-term interest rates.  
The above-outlined scenario of a very rapid growth of consumption and demand for credit 
has been accounted for by real interest rates reduction. Two more effects should be 
brought to light here. The first refers to the changes in the collateral value, being in 
possession of companies and private persons. Lower nominal interest rates increase the 
collateral value (and also perceived wealth) and via this channel have an additional impact 
on the increase in demand for credit. The second possible effect is the nominal illusion that 
assumes lack of rationality of some individuals. It is reinforced by the fact that the Polish 
economy experienced relatively long period of high inflation and, consequently, of high 
nominal interest rates. This bears the risk that reduction in nominal interest rates may be 
perceived as decrease in real interest rates of similar size. In these circumstances, demand 
would be additionally boosted. 
A very high rate of credit growth might pose a threat to the banking sector stability. An 
increase in demand for credit bears the risk that banks may pursue less prudential lending 
policies. It might particularly be the case if banks strive for either retaining or increasing 
their market share. Bank managers can consider such a situation as a good opportunity to 
win new customers or sell other products to the current clients. If lending policies turned 
out to be too lax and loan applications not properly scrutinized, it would result in the 
subsequent deteriorating of the quality of the banks’ loans portfolio. Incurring inevitable 
large credit losses would be the price for too large an appetite of the banking sector for the 
market share. 
Higher domestic demand and the growth of borrowing requirements of the economy 
would lead to the current account deterioration. The long lasting current account deficit 
leads to accumulation of foreign debt, thus increasing the costs of its servicing. Were it not 
compensated for by the appropriate growth of income, at some point creditors might cut 
off further supply of funds. The Maastricht fiscal criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact 
impose restrictions on the level of public debt. Poland might be quite close to those limits 
so an increase in the economy-wide debt level will reflect increase in companies and 
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South-East Asia was a major factor that led to currency crises. Although monetary union 
membership rules out the possibility of the currency turbulence, it does not entirely 
protect against dangers ensuing from external imbalances. Such problems might only be 
postponed, but not eliminated. If foreign debt were allocated in the economy via the 
banking sector (i.e. banks refinanced domestic lending activity abroad), then the cut-off of 
supply of foreign financing (being the result of the higher risk resulting from too high debt 
and current account deficit levels) would hit the home banks in the first order. The banks 
would then try to overcome such a difficulty by curtailing their lending activities. As a 
result, a boom and bust cycle might occur.  
Therefore, economic policy should be tightened before the moment of joining the euro-
zone and remain moderately tight for some time afterwards in order to prevent excessive 
rise in the consumption and credit demand. Once in the euro-zone, when the conduct of 
the monetary policy will be “transferred” to the ECB, the only way to do so will be to 
tighten fiscal policy.  
 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
 
Current stage of Poland’s economic development marks a significant shift in the 
environment within which the monetary authorities operate. On the one hand, 
completion of the disinflation path seems to make the central bank’s job relatively easy. 
On the other hand, however, requirements to be met on the road to the euro-zone are very 
challenging. Moreover, the process of approaching the monetary union will be 
accompanied by precipitated, due to EU membership, changes in the Polish economy. 
This, in turn, may distort the so far observed relationships in the economy and thus make 
policy conduct more difficult.  
In terms of the Maastricht criteria, it is that pertaining to fiscal requirements that should be 
of particular concern. Fiscal imbalance would also impinge on the fulfilment of other 
criteria, not least on those related to the price and exchange rate stability. Successful 
membership within the ERM II framework will largely hinge on the appropriateness of the 
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turbulence that even prudential macroeconomic policy combined with the parity 
consistent with the equilibrium exchange rate may not rule out the nightmare scenario. 
Numerous drawbacks of the ERM II by far outweigh its advantages and, therefore, it 
should be perceived as a “waiting room” rather than a “useful framework”. Adding to that 
potential trade-off between nominal and real convergence as well as vagueness of the rules 
on which the assessment of one’s eligibility for euro-zone membership is based, one might 
come to the conclusion that the path to the monetary union will be beset with numerous 
difficulties.  
Sound and transparent monetary policy and establishment of the parity at the level 
consistent with the equilibrium exchange rate should help to mitigate the effects of 
potential obstacles. However, it is fiscal discipline that will constitute the crucial factor in 
the successful accession process. In addition, not only would it mitigate a threat of the 
currency crisis within the ERM II, but it might also counteract the risk of overheating 
subsequent to joining the euro-zone. 
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